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General Overview of Area Covered

Java Sea. (13 Nov. 2014). Google Maps. Google. Retrieved from https://www.google.com/maps/@3.5501863,118.9849733,8983666m/data=!3m1!1e3
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Map of Indonesia

Indonesia.
(13 Nov. (13
2014).
Google
Maps.
Google.
Retrieved
from Retrieved
https://www.google.com/maps/@Indonesia
Nov.
2014).
Google
Maps.
Google.
from
1.297215,113.4006045,4499316m/data=!3m1!1e3

https://www.google.com/maps/@-1.297215,113.4006045,4499316m/data=!3m1!1e3

5

Conflict Overview
OVERVIEW
"CrisisWatch Indonesia." International Crisis Group. January 2018.
https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia.
The International Crisis Group provides analysis of ongoing political and violent strife all
over the world. Their Indonesia country profile includes the latest reports and briefings
of terrorist activities and government counterinsurgency operations in the region.
“Aceh: A timeline of insurgency.” CNN, May 19, 2003.
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/05/19/aceh.timeline/
The article consists of a brief timeline chronicling important events in the Aceh province
of Indonesia. The timeline lists selected events showing Indonesian independence from
the Netherlands and the formation and actions of rebel groups in Aceh.
Gershman, J. “Indonesia: Islands of conflict.” Asia Times, October 26, 2002.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/DJ26Ae05.html
The article begins with a description of Indonesia’s demographic makeup. The article
then lists what the author sees as the two major points of conflict in Indonesia, selfdetermination and communal. Each type of conflict is explained followed by the toll
they have taken with a focus on factors believed to have contributed to escalations in
violence. The article ends with the author analyzing the role of the United States in the
region in regards to policies and economic and strategic interests.
MILITANT G ROUPS
“Indonesia.” International Crisis Group, 2014. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-eastasia/indonesia

The International Crisis Group is an independent organization that provides reports,
analysis and recommendations regarding different trouble areas/hot spots in the world.
Their mission statement is to help prevent and resolve deadly conflict. The website
allows the user to obtain region and country specific reports through the menu bars
along the top and left side of the page. The reports range in topic from terrorism and
violent attacks to government instability and other factors that could lead to or
contribute to violent conflict or outbreaks. Recent reports made by the International
Crisis Group are listed on each page and contain an overview of the situation and in
some cases provide additional information and recommendations. An additional
resource on the page, the crises watch database allows the user to search by country
and access a compilation of news reports from outside sites pertaining to a particular
6

country or multiple countries. All articles are presented chronologically with a summary
of their content.
The site provides a series of in-depth reports on Indonesian security issues, including:
•
Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s publishing industry, (2008, February 28)
•
Indonesia: Jihadi surprise in Aceh, (2010, April 20)
•
Indonesia: The dark side of Jama’ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), (2010, July 6)
•
The ongoing extremist threat in Indonesia, (2011, June 15)
•
Indonesia: From vigilantism to terrorism in Cirebon, (2012, January 26)
•
How Indonesian extremists regroup, (2012, July 16)
•
Indonesia: Dynamics of violence in Papua, (2012, August 9)
•
Papuan ‘separatists’ vs jihadi ‘terrorists’: Indonesian policy dilemmas (2013,
January 22)

Regional Terrorist/Insurgent/Militant Groups
JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH (JI)
"Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)." Terrorism Research & Analysis Center. 2017.
https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/jemaah-islamiyah-ji.
The Terrorism Research & Analysis Center (TRAC) is among the premier groups in
tracking and studying extremist groups. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is an Islamist extremist
group active in Southeast Asia that became emboldened during the rise of ISIS in the
Middle East. The group’s predominant area of operations is in the Philippines, Malaysia,
Indonesia, and Thailand. Their Indonesian cell due to counterinsurgency operations and
the prevalence of other extremist groups in the region centralized and consolidated
within the Abu Sayyaf Group. Many of its members also joined the Islamic State when it
formally entered the region in strength 2015 - 2016.
“Jemaah Islamiyah (a.k.a. Jemaah Islamiah)”. Council on Foreign Relations. June 19, 2009.
http://www.cfr.org/indonesia/jemaah-islamiyah-k-jemaah-islamiah/p8948
In this article, the Council on Foreign Relations provides a background on Jemaah
Islamiyah (JI) divided into different individually accessible topics. The topics included
regarding JI are, JI foundations, leadership, recorded attacks, pursuit of, threat to
Americans and American interests, links to other terrorist groups, size of the
organization, efforts by Indonesia and neighboring countries against JI, and the impact
of security measures against JI.
For additional overviews of the group, see the 2011 profile by the Center for
International & Strategic Studies (Jemaah Islamiyah: http://csis.org/publication/jemaahislamiyah) and the profile by Stanford’s “Mapping Militant Organizations” research
7

project, updated in 2012 (Jemaah Islamiyah:
http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/251).
Golburt, Yanina. “An in-depth look at the Jemaah Islamiyah network.” Al Nakhlah, 2004.
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/AlNakhlah/Archives/~/media/Fletcher/Microsites/al%20Nakhlah/archives/pdfs/golburt.as
hx
This article, written for the Fletcher School (Tufts University) Online Journal for issues
related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization, provides a look at the formation and
structure of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). The article covers the follow topics regarding JI,
structure, training, financing, links with Al-Qaeda, and threat assessment. It concludes
with the author’s policy recommendations for Indonesia and the United States.
JI LEADERSHIP/HIGH-PROFILE MEMBERS
UMAR PATEK

Abuza, Zachary. “JI operative Umar Patek arrested in Pakistan.” CTC Sentinel, 4 no. 4 (April,
2011): 16-17. https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/ji-operative-umar-patek-arrested-in-pakistan
This article provides a brief profile Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) senior member, Umar Patek.
The profile provided chronicles his activities within JI and the impact of his arrest in
2011. Patek’s arrest was a setback to JI due to their dwindling amount of first
generation leaders and the resulting splinter groups that form during a leadership
vacuum. The author states that with additional splinter groups forming off of JI it
hampers their ability to launch any large-scale attacks; however it allows them to more
easily avoid detection.
RIDUAN ISAMUDDIN

“Hambali: ‘Asia’s Bin Laden.’” BBC, September 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/2346225.stm
This BBC news article provides a background on Hambali (Riduan Isamuddin) the former
operations chief of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). He is believed to have been connected to the
attack on the USS Cole, the Bali Bombing, and the attack on the Marriott hotel in
Jakarta.
ABU BAKAR BASHIR

McCoy, Clifford. “Old and new faces of Indonesian terror.” Asia Times, August, 2010.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/LH20Ae02.html
The Asia Times article describes the impact of the arrest of Abu Bakar Bashir, the former
spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and founder of the Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid
8

(JAT). He was also involved in a training camp in Aceh consisting of seven groups
referred to as lintas tanzim (cross-organizational project). Bashir’s influence on JAT and
groups associated with it exhibit what is seen by the author as a new form of militant
Islam in Indonesia, with a focus on establishing Islamic law throughout all of Indonesia
and avoiding the killing of other Muslims. Bashir’s high profile presence with this group
may have led to it becoming a focus of counter-terrorism officials. He lost favor with
some groups due to what they viewed as his recklessness regarding planning and
operations but he could still exert an influence while in prison. The main concern as
seen by the author is the alteration of existing groups’ motivations to a singular goal of
establishing Islamic law in all of Indonesia and focusing attacks on non-Muslims and
anyone who obstructs the implementation of Islamic law.
Teslik, Lee Hudson. “Profile: Abu Bakar Bashir (a.k.a. Ba’asyir).” Council on Foreign Relations.
June, 2006. http://www.cfr.org/indonesia/profile-abu-bakar-bashir-k-baasyir/p10219
This report by the Council on Foreign Relations from 2006 provides a background on
Abu Bakar Bashir (a.k.a Ba’asyir). The topics covered in the report are, Abu Bakar’s bio,
personal history, what terrorist acts he is linked to, any associations with al-Qaeda or
other groups and the dangers he poses.
NOORDIN MOHAMED

“Obituary: Noordin Mohamed Top.” BBC. September, 2009.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4302368.stm
This article from the BBC provides a brief overview of Noordin Mohamed, believed to
have been a recruiter and financier associated with Jemaah Islamiah (JI) before forming
his own group. He was suspected in assisting with the planning and financing of several
attacks in Indonesia. During this time he was believed to have operated under an
assumed name, Abdurrachman Aufi. Indonesian security forces killed Noordin in
September of 2009.
JI AND EXTERNAL C ONNECTIONS/A SSOCIATIONS
CONNECTIONS TO IS AND AQ IN SYRIA

“Indonesians and the Syrian Conflict.” IPAC Report No. 6. January 30.
http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2014/01/IPAC_Indonesians_the_Syrian_Conflic
t.pdf
This report, provided by the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) examines the
impact that the conflict in Syria has had on Indonesian extremist groups. Due to the
location and continued fighting, Syria has been a lodestone for different radical groups
to send fighters and monetary aid to. The appeal of Syria to these groups is also
extended due to several books, especially Tumult at the End of Time written by a
9

company affiliated with Jemaah Islamiyah, predicting Syria as being the final conflict
that leads to the end of the world. Indonesian groups have provided support to Syrian
terrorist groups through medical, financial, and material aid in areas that support their
cause and are also believed to have sent at least 50 fighters over as well. The article
then provides a description of the different factions within Syria and Indonesia. The
author concludes that the conflict in Syria does impact Indonesian terrorist groups to a
degree but the majority of their motivation and focus will come from local issues.
GHURABA CELL AND PAKISTAN

Joscelyn, Thomas. “Al Qaeda cell targeted by Treasury Department tied to multiple terror
groups.” The Long War Journal. August, 2011.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/08/the_treasury_departm.php
This article covers the addition of three members of Jemaah Islamiyah’s (JI), by the
Treasury Department to its global terrorist list in 2011. Two of them, Abdul Rahim
Ba’asyir (Abdul Rahim) and Muhammad Jibril Abdul Rahman (Jibril) are considered
senior members with the al Ghuraba cell of JI, located in Karachi, Pakistan. The Ghuraba
cell is a group connected to both al Qaeda and JI with the goal of training additional
terrorists. The article continues to describe the identification of the Ghuraba cell and
several of its members in 2003 by the CIA through information gathered from detainees.
The article concludes with providing additional information on the group regarding
arrests, intelligence and whereabouts of the particular members as of 2011.
JI PLEDGE TO ISIS
For more information on ISIS operations in Southeast Asia view their other sections in this
document on page 21, 38, and 55.
“Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)”Counter Extremism Project, 2016.
https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/jemaah-islamiyah-ji
Even though he is continuing to serve his 15 years jail sentence following his arrest in
2010, Abu Bakar Bashir still plays a major leadership role. In 2014, he directed his
followers to pledge themselves and the group to ISIS and ordered that 200 JI members
go to Syria to train. The immigration laws in Indonesia do not impose any criminal
charges against returnees who have fought for a foreign entity. In a time where JI is
seeking to become a relevant threat again, returning fighters could provide the impetus
for new attacks. (See the following article regarding the later withdrawal of support for
ISIS)
WITHDRAWAL OF PLEDGE

Soeriaatmadja, Wahyudi. “Bashir Withdraws Support for ISIS.” The Straits Times, January 9,
2016. http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/bashir-withdraws-support-for-isis
10

Abu Bakar Bashir announced his withdrawal of support for ISIS based on new
information he has received. According to his lawyer, Bashir sent a team of associates to
Turkey to meeting of Syrian and Turkish Islamic leaders and groups and at this meeting
Bashir’s team was counseled against supporting ISIS. In addition, his research team
reviewed ISIS social media posts and that influence their decision to withdraw support
as well. Bashir claims that even though ISIS is not the group to establish this, he still
wants sharia law established around the world and will support any group that believes
this as long they follow certain guidelines.
JI REBUILDING EFFORTS
"Indonesian Police Announce Arrests of Jakarta Terror Attack Suspects." Deutsche Welle,
January 16, 2016. http://www.dw.com/en/indonesian-police-announce-arrests-ofjakarta-terror-attack-suspects/a-18983999.
The Islamic State claimed responsibility for an attack in the heart of Indonesia’s capital
of Jakarta. The attack killed seven and wounded over thirty. This is attack marks the first
large scale act of terror in Jakarta carried out by the Islamic State. The governments of
Indonesia and Malaysia responded quickly by removing extremist social media posts and
radical websites. The intelligence sharing by both governments led to a number of
arrests in Indonesia and Malaysia connected to the attack in Jakarta.
Fabi, Randy., and Kanupriya Kapoor. “As Indonesia Hunts Down Islamic State, Homegrown
Jihadis Regroup.” Reuters, February 16, 2016. https://uk.reuters.com/article/ukindonesia-security/as-indonesia-hunts-down-islamic-state-homegrown-jihadis-regroupidUKKCN0VN12A
JI has shifted its strategy to focusing on obtaining its goals in Indonesia before looking to
the grander plan of world-wide sharia law. Abu Rusydan, the on the ground leader who
some think plays a comparable role to Abu Bakar Bashir is working to garner support
from the public in order to gain more recruits. He stated that they “must be peaceful up
to a certain point” and that if the government will listen to their words then they do not
need to conduct large scale attacks like the Bali bombing. According to former
members and deradicalization organizers JI is regrouping, seeking to build up while
staying under the radar and then strike when conditions are optimal for them to have
the most impact.
Jenkins, Nash. “Indonesia’s Jihadi Extremist Group Is Rebounding, Experts and Members Say.”
Time, February 14, 2016. http://time.com/4224585/jemaah-islamiyah-indonesiaterrorist-ji-islamist/
Following a series of large-scale arrests and schisms within the group, Jemaah Islamiyah
had become mostly stagnant and attacks had lessened. In 2014, the group pledged to
ISIS and maintains close ties to Abu Sayyaf. In January of 2016, the once dwindling
group launched an attack in Jakarta and former members of the group stated that the
group preparing for a resurgence. JI is in the rebuilding and recruiting stage, they are
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sending people to Syria to train with ISIS and increasing their recruiting efforts at home.
As of the time of this article publication (Feb, 2016) JI is believed to be at around 2,000
members, which is similar to its strength before the arrests and forming of various
splinter groups.
ISLAMIC STATE IN INDONESIA
Chan, Francis. "Efforts Under Way to Verify Chatter About Death of Indonesian ISIS Leader
Linked to Marina Bay Plot." The Straits Times, December 4, 2017.
http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/efforts-underway-to-verify-chatter-aboutthe-death-of-indonesian-isis-leader-linked-to.
A multi-agency effort is underway to verify the veracity of the claims that Bahrun Naim,
the ISIS affiliated terrorist who was the orchestrator of the 2016 attack in Jakarta, was
killed in Syria. Naim’s lawyer stated that he received word of his death and several
analysts had seen it communicated on several communication platforms that terror
groups often use but officials are waiting for visual or DNA proof from local authorities
before issuing an official confirmation of Naim’s death.
Quinones, Michael. "Inside the Khilafah 4, “Hijrah Will Not Cease”." Terrorism Research &
Analysis Center. September 24, 2017. https://www.trackingterrorism.org/chatter/videoal-hayat-media-center-islamic-state-releases-inside-khilafah-4-24-september-2017.
A propaganda and recruitment film released by ISIS’s Al Hayat Media Center calls for an
influx of foreign fighters to come to the Philippines and Indonesia to fight the
“crusaders.” The speaker, known as Abu Uqayl also directs would be adherents to go
fight in Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan, Africa or Libya.
Edwards, Will. "ISIS' Reach Extends to Southeast Asia." Cipher Brief, August 20, 2017.
https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/asia/isis-reach-latches-southeast-asia.
The ongoing siege of the Philippine city of Marawi, occupied by the ISIS affiliated Maute
and Abu Sayyaf groups, has called attention to the growing threat of ISIS funded and
affiliated groups in Southeast Asia. Recently, a plot by ISIS-affiliated Jemaah Ansharut
Daulah in Indonesia attempted to conduct a chemical explosive attack in Jakarta was
foiled and showcased the encrypted messaging services groups are using to coordinate
attacks. A cooperative task force of Malaysian, Philippine, and Indonesian forces will
start operations against these groups, with Sayyaf in particular since its maritime attacks
threaten all three nations.
FREE PAPUA ORGANIZATION (ORGANISASI PAPUA MERDEKA OPM)
“Insurgencies and Peace Processes.” Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict. 2013.
http://www.understandingconflict.org/conflict/index/5/Insurgencies
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This Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) article describes the different
insurgencies in Indonesia’s history. They are presented chronologically and by region.
The Free Aceh Movement is covered along with the Free Papua Organization (Organisasi
Papua Merdeka, OPM) which is a small rebel group that has been in conflict with
government forces since 1964. The goal of the OPM is to acquire complete
independence from Indonesia.
MUJAHIDIN INDONESIA TIMOR (MIT) AND THE HARAKAH SUNNI UNTUK MASYARAKAT INDONESIA
(HASMI)
Zenn, Jacob. “Next Generation Radicals in Indonesia. Asia Times. June, 2013.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/SEA-01-120613.html
This article describes what the author sees as the newest homegrown threats to
Indonesia. Several of these groups have followed the examples set by JI, JAT, and Abu
Bakar Bashir. The two groups focused on by the article are the Mujahidin Indonesia
Timor (MIT) and the Harakah Sunni untuk Masyarakat Indonesia (HASMI-Sunni
Movement for Indonesian Society). The MIT has ties to JAT especially through its leader,
Santoso, who was a former leader in JAT. The article continues to describe the
motivations of each group, the planned attacks and actually attacks associated with the
groups and the level of impact they have had. The author proposes that these new
groups have yet to make any significant impact on Indonesia’s reputation and that it is
vital for the Indonesian government to utilize democratic practices

Smuggling/Drug Trafficking/Criminal Activity
Felbab-Brown, Vanda. “Indonesia Field Reports.” The Brookings Institution, 2013.
http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2013/02/06-indonesia-gangs-felbabbrown
This report provides an overview of the various gangs active in Indonesia, their
structure, evolution, connections to certain political parties and the government’s
response/interactions with them. The author reports that connections between the
gangs and organized terrorist groups so far are low and infrequent. However, they
could escalate if left unchecked.
See the author’s series of reports on illicit economies and organized crime in Indonesia. Sample
titles:
•
Crime as a mirror of politics: Urban gangs in Indonesia
•
Bali high, rainforest low: The illicit drug trade in Indonesia
•
The last twitch? Wildlife trafficking, illegal fishing, and lessons from anti-piracy
efforts
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Malacca Straits and Maritime Security
Mathews, Alfred Daniel. "Indonesian Maritime Security Cooperation in the Malacca Straits."
Thesis,
Naval Postgraduate School, 2015. Calhoun Institutional Archive of the Naval
Postgraduate School, June 2015.
https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/45897/15Jun_Matthews_Alfred.pdf?
sequence=1.
This thesis from the Naval Postgraduate School examines the relationship between
Indonesia’s desire for regional security cooperation and their political relationship with
their neighbors who share the waters. The resulting relationship and need for security in
the face of growing threats created the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) and
Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy. The balance between
sovereignty of waters and the need for security and cooperation is the primary question
examined in this thesis.
Chalk, Peter “Assessing the Recent Terrorist Threat to the Malacca Strait. CTC Sentinel, 3(4):
(April, 2010):8-10. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/assessing-the-recent-terroristthreat-to-the-malacca-strait
This report by Dr. Peter Chalk, a Senior Policy Analyst with the Rand Corporation and an
Adjunct Professor with the Naval Postgraduate School, evaluates the threat of terrorist
attacks on shipping in the Malacca Strait by the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). The most likely
types of attack scenarios and the vulnerabilities of different crafts are examined. The
likelihood of a maritime attack at the Malacca Strait by the JI is deemed low by the
author due to the JI’s lack of maritime operations, the existing level of security at the
Straight, and the availability of higher profile targets elsewhere.

Counter-Terrorism/Law Enforcement
SCHSIM F OLLOWING A RRESTS
Abuza, Zachary. “New Directions for Indonesian Militants after Successful Counterterrorism
Operations.” Terrorism Monitor, 8 no. 41.November, 2010.
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4cdce1682.html
Indonesian counter-terrorism police forces led several successful operations against
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) resulting in over 450 arrests from 2003-2009. In response to these
arrests, JI split off into different groups who espoused conflicting ideologies regarding
the focus of their mission and where attacks should be concentrated. The article
provides additional examples of how this sequence of events repeated itself with
leadership being removed and group members joining other organizations or forming
new ones. Despite the initial successes of Indonesian counterterrorism forces they have
faced setbacks due to criticism regarding aggressive tactics.
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RESPONSE AND ANALYSIS
Aspinall, Edward. “Aceh/Indonesia: Conflict Analysis and Options for Systemic Conflict
Transformation.” Berghof Foundation for Peace Support. August, 2005.
http://www.berghofpeacesupport.org/publications/SCT_Aceh_Conflict_Analysis_and_Systemic_CT.pdf
This report for the Berghof Foundation for Peace begins by the author presenting the
events and issues that he views as contributed to the growth and development of the
Free Aceh Movement also known as the GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka). These factors
include religion, human rights issues, and availability of natural resources, government
corruption, and poverty. The report continues to provide information on all of the
different groups involved on both sides of the conflict while also identifying possible
challenges to the peace process. The author provides two possible avenues to increase
dialogue and potentially lead to resolution of the conflict. The first option is a series of
dialogues and workshops based off of similar processes conducted in Northern Ireland,
Sri Lanka and Mindanao. The second option focuses on using the post-tsunami
rebuilding process as a unifying factor.
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Map of the Philippines

Philippines. (13 Nov. 2014). Google Maps. Google. Retrieved from
https://www.google.com/maps/@11.6978351,122.6217543,2203499m/data=!3m1!1e3
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Philippines
CONFLICT OVERVIEW
"The Philippines: Extremism & Counter-Extremism." Counter Extremism Project. January 2018.
https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/philippines.
This report from the Counter Extremism Project is an in-depth overview of extremist
groups and counterinsurgency operations within the Philippines. Since the turn of the
century, the Philippines have been in constant strife with Communist Rebel separatist
groups and Islamic extremist groups that have participated in bombings, kidnappings,
organized criminal activity, and guerilla tactics against government forces. In the last
few years, since the rise of the Islamic State and globalization of extremist ideologies,
the Philippine government has been forced to face an emboldened and stronger
insurgency presence that has captivated much of Southeast Asia.
"Philippines Profile - Timeline." BBC News, January 9, 2018.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-15581450.
This BBC article makes available a chronology of key conflict events in the Philippines
dating back to 1896. It offers a screenshot of the significant events that have shaped
the modern Philippines and also provides additional links to articles about select
contemporary events.
OVERVIEW OF MILITANT GROUPS OPERATING IN PHILIPPINES

“Guide to the Philippines Conflict.” BBC, December 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/7887521.stm
This BBC article from 2009 provides a description of four different groups operating out
of the Philippines. This article presents the different groups’ existence, background,
goals and interactions with the Philippine government. The groups described are the
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Abu
Sayyaf, and the New Peoples’ Army (militant wing of the Philippines Communist Party).
Bhattacharji, Preeti.“Terrorism Havens: Philippines.” Council on Foreign Relations. June, 2009.
http://www.cfr.org/philippines/terrorism-havens-philippines/p9365
This report from 2009 by the Council on Foreign Relations provides background
information on terrorist groups in the Philippines. The topics covered after the initial
introduction are whether the Philippines are considered a terrorist haven, the existing
terrorist groups in the Philippines, connections to al-Qaeda, steps taken by the
Philippine government to combat/contain terrorist activity, responses by the Philippine
government to the September 11 attacks, and the role of the United States in
combating terrorism in the Philippines.
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DISPLACEMENT AND CONFLICT

Hedman, Eva-Lotta. “The Philippines: Conflict and Internal Displacement in Mindanao and the
Sulu Archipelago.” Report Commissioned by the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, Emergency and Technical Support Service. 2009.
http://www.observatori.org/paises/pais_63/documentos/UNHCR.pdf
This 2009 report by E. Hedman examines the background of the conflict in the
Philippines. The report begins by describing the movement by the Muslim minority in
the Philippines for an independent homeland and its escalation. The Philippine
government has been forced to combat the threat of what are seen as “Moro homeland
separatists” and Islamist terror groups. The report further examines the roots of the
conflict and offers that the previous forced displacement of the Muslim minority can be
seen as an important factor in regard to the separatists turning to violence and being
more open to radicalization. Hedman predicts based on past events and the events
leading up to 2009 that there will be continued violence in the region.

Regional Terrorist/Insurgent/Militant Groups
ABU SAYYAF G ROUP (ASG)
Sarmiento, Bong S. "Philippines Vows to Crush ‘Weakened’ Abu Sayyaf Terror Group." Asian
Correspondent, February 5, 2018. https://asiancorrespondent.com/2018/02/militaryabu-sayyaf/#JJuwphE6C3M4ofTJ.97.
Government operations against a weakened Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Philippines
will continue in an effort to eradicate the remaining ISIS affiliated militants. The
government killed over 350 members of the militant group since last year and have
taken back much of the territory that ISIS and ASG held. The five-month war against ASG
and ISIS displaced more than 350,000 Philippine citizens and claimed over 1,000 lives.
“Abu Sayyaf Group” Council on Foreign Relations. May, 2009.
http://www.cfr.org/philippines/abu-sayyaf-group-philippines-islamist-separatists/p9235
The Council on Foreign Relations created a report in 2009 on the background of Abu
Sayyaf. The report provides a report on the group. The report covers the origins of Abu
Sayyaf, its leadership, terrorist acts it is responsible for, its operations area, size, and the
level of threat it pertains to Americans.
For additional overviews of the group, see the 2011 profile by the Center for
International & Strategic Studies (Abu Sayyaf Group: http://csis.org/publication/abusayyaf-group)
The case study on Abu Sayyaf by the Center for International and Strategic Studies
provides a look at the foundation of the group, its connections, resurgence and
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fragmentation. The document concludes with predictions of the future of the group and
what its presence/impact could be by 2025.
And the profile by Stanford’s “Mapping Militant Organizations” research project,
updated in 2013 (Abu Sayyaf: http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgibin/groups/view/152).
This report begins by providing a summary of the organization and then details its
progression of leadership, goals, names changes, size, influence, targets, and locations.
This information is presented in numbered and bulleted lists and short paragraphs.
There is a menu on the right of the page that allows for quick navigation to individual
topics in the report.
Abu Sayyaf Activities
Chan, Francis. "Abu Sayyaf Free Two Indonesian Fishermen." The Straits Times, January 21,
2018. http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/abu-sayyaf-free-two-indonesianfishermen.
Two Indonesian fisherman captured by Abu Sayyaf militants off the coast of Sabah were
released from captivity. Abu Sayyaf has increased their presence at sea, committing acts
of piracy and robbing ships at port.
Boyd, Alan. “Anti-Piracy Patrols Adrift in Terror-Targeted Waterway.” Asia Times, August 30,
2017. http://www.atimes.com/article/anti-piracy-patrols-adrift-terror-targetedwaterway/
Seaborne attacks, with a focus on abduction and ransom, by the Abu Sayyaf group in the
Sibutu Passage between Malaysia and the Philippines have shifted from fishing vessels
to large-scale commercial ships. As a result of Abu Sayyaf’s shift in targets, there have
been 59 abductions and four murders in over the course of 18 months, as compared to
5 abductions in all of 2015. The Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia jointly patrol this
area with the goal of countering Abu Sayyaf but coordination and communication issues
have impacted their response times.
Jannaral, Julmuniri I., and Al Jacinto. "Abu Sayyaf Member, 7 Others Nabbed in Sulu." Manila
Times, August 20, 2017. http://www.manilatimes.net/abu-sayyaf-member-7-othersnabbed-sulu/345709/.
Several raids were made over the weekend by local law enforcement and the Philippine
Marines in order to capture Abu Sayyaf members wanted for murder and piracy. The
operations captured leading figure Fahar Ismael (aks Putoh Taron) and but failed to
capture Tenti Taup Mangarin. Several of their associates were captured along with a
cache of small arms and ammunition.
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Fonbuena, Carmela. “Notorious Abu Sayyaf Sub-Leader Killed in Sulu, Says Military.”
Rappler, August 13, 2017.http://www.rappler.com/nation/178558-abu-sayyaf-killedmuktadil
Badong Muktadil, a high-ranking Abu Sayyaf member, was killed by the Philippine Navy
after residents provided a description of the boat they saw him boarding. Muktadil was
wanted for the hijacking of the Vietnamese ship MV Giang Hai along with several
abductions and murders. He and his followers were also wanted by Malaysian
authorities for multiple hijackings and attacks.
Abu Sayyaf Pledges to ISIS
“Abu Sayyaf Group” Counter Extremism Project. December, 2017.
https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/abu-sayyaf-group
The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) originally formed in 1991 after a split from the Moro
National Liberation Front in 1989. The majority of the group remained as an al-Qaeda
affiliate, but in 2014 the faction based out of Basilon, led by Isnilon Hapilon, pledged
itself to the Islamic State. This detailed Counter Extremism Project report continues to
provide an in-depth look at the group’s funding, targets, training, recruitment tactics,
doctrine and leadership.
FACTIONS LEADER: ISNILON HAPILON (KILLED OCTOBER 2017)

France-Presse, Agence. "IS Southeast Asia Chief Killed in Philippines." Jakarta Post, October 16,
2017.
http://www.thejakartapost.com/seasia/2017/10/16/is-southeast-asia-chief-killed-inphilippines.html.
Isnilon Hapilon, emir of IS in Southeast Asia, and Omar Maute, one of the two leading
Maute brothers of the Maute group were killed by Philippine government forces during
operations to retake Marawi. The size and scope of the attack caused concern that the
city would be used as a base of operations for ISIS in the area. Hapilon had a $5 million
bounty on him and DNA testing is being conducted to completely confirm his death.
Laccino, Ludovica. “Who is Isnilon Hapilon? The Charismatic ISIS Emir at Heart of Philippines’
Marawi Siege.” International Business Times, June 13, 2017.
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/who-isnilon-hapilon-charismatic-isis-emir-heart-philippinesmarawi-siege-1626101
Isnilon Hapilon joined Abu Sayyaf sometime in the late 1990’s, possibly 1997. He
climbed the ranks through his involvement in abduction for ransom of civilians and
military members including the 2001 abduction of 20 civilians from a private resort. In
2014, he and his followers split from the main Abu Sayyaff Group and pledged to ISIS.
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ISIS AFFILIATED GROUPS:
For more information on ISIS operations in Southeast Asia, see their other sections on page 10,
38, and 55.
IS IN THE PHILIPPINES

Cigaral, Ian Nicolas. "Military Sees ISIS-inspired Turaife Group as Major Threat." The Philippine
Star, December 15, 2017.
http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/12/15/1768672/military-sees-isis-inspiredturaife-group-major-threat.
Esmail Abdulmalik, who goes by the name Abu Turaife, could be selected to take over as
the lead ISIS commander in the Philippines. After the defeat of the Maute group and the
death of Isnilon Hapilon, the self-styled Turaife group, though few in number, has
already been suspected of planning several bombings and has the potential to become a
serious threat in the region.
Sarmiento, Bong S. "Islamic State Lurks in Philippine Shadows." Asia Times, November 7, 2017.
http://www.atimes.com/article/islamic-state-lurks-philippine-shadows/.
Despite the siege of Marawi being over and the deaths of former Abu Sayyaf leader
Isnilon Hapilon and Omar Maute of the Maute Group, there is still a serious militant
threat in the Philippines. Amin Baco, a bomb-maker who is affiliated with Jemaah
Islamiyah, is believed to be next in line to take over for Isnilon Hapilon and Puruji
Indama, another Abu Sayyaf leader, is believed to be planning new attacks. There are at
least four ISIS affiliated groups operating in the Philippines, though several are
numerically diminished after losses in Marawi, they still pose a serious threat.
Kugelman, Michael. “Filipino ISIS ‘Not a Rag-Tag Group of Rebels.’ Cipher Brief, October 5, 2017.
https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/asia/filipino-isis-not-rag-tag-grouprebels?utm_source=Join+the+Community+Subscribers&utm_campaign=2fecf5ef03TCB+October+5+2017&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_02cbee778d-2fecf5ef03122455129
The actions and tactics of the ISIS affiliated groups caught the Philippine government by
surprise due to their different tactics and technological advancements compared to
other regional insurgent groups. Normal counterterrorism efforts dealt with groups
using small arms and operating out of remote bases in the jungles and rural areas.
Urban warfare against a highly organized group that uses drones for reconnaissance and
encrypted messaging apps to coordinate attacks was a departure from past operations.
The responding actions by the military against the group may serve as propaganda for
recruits and analysts believe that ISIS backed groups have found a fertile area to grow in
the Philippines and will be a problem for some time.
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ABU SAYYAF AND OTHERS

“Islamic State Philippines (ISP, ISISP)-Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).” TRAC, 2016.
https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/islamic-state-philippines-isp-abu-sayyafgroup-asg
Four different groups have pledged their allegiance to ISIS in the Philippines. Isnilon
Hapilon’s Basilan based faction of Abu Sayaff Group (ASG), a faction of the Bansamoro
Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), the Maute Group, and the Ansarul Kilafah Phillippines.
This piece provides a brief distinction between the ASG faction that support ISIS and the
faction that supports AQ and provide several videos on the groups allegiance to IS along
with a list of arrested members, past leaders, areas of operations and photos of the
group. The Ansarul Kilafah is a group that splintered off from the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) when the main group entered into a peace deal with the
government and the BIFF was the armed wing of the MILF that split during the peace
process as well.
MAUTE GROUP

“Maute Group.” TRAC, 2016. https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/maute-group-islamicstate-lanao-daulat-ul-islamiya-daulah-islamiyah
The Maute Group is led by two brothers, Omar Maute and Abdullah Maute, who started
off minor-criminals and moved on to start a militant group in 2012, the Khalifa Islamiah
Mindanao. Their group expanded and established strong ties to Jemaah Islamiyah in
Indonesia but then pledged to ISIS in 2015.The group is connected to regional drug
trafficking and is believed to have a high number of college educated individuals as a byproduct of its recruitment actions targeting Mindanao State University.

Marawi Siege
"The House Behind the Philippine Rebel Siege of Marawi." Reuters, October 30, 2017.
https://reuters.com/video/2017/10/30/the-house-behind-the-philippine-rebelsi?videoId=372842695.
A look into the building where Isnilon Hapilon and his followers planned the attack on
Marawi shows how well prepared they were. When security forces first tried to capture
him before the siege, Hapilon escaped through a hole blasted in the back of the house
and then gathered his followers for the attack on Marawi. Locals claim to have had no
idea there were extremists living nearby and claimed they would have turned him in if
they knew. With Isnilon and Omar Maute’s deaths, the inhabitants of Marawi hope to
begin the long process of rebuilding.
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Gunaratna, Rohan. “Manila Scores a Victory against ISIS but More Battles Loom.” Cipher Brief,
October 5, 2017. https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/asia/manila-scores-victory-isisbattles-loom
The Philippine security forces along with international assistance have defeated the
majority of the IS affiliated forces in Marawi, with up to 700 militants being killed during
the four month long siege. There is still resistance but many of the surviving militants
have left the city and are in the process of joining up with other pro-ISIS groups and are
believed to be plotting attacks on several other cities in the area.
“Women and Children Fighting Alongside Islamic State Militants in Marawi.” Asian
Correspondent, September 5, 2017. https://asiancorrespondent.com/2017/09/womenchildren-fighting-alongside-islamic-state-militants-marawi/ - YWdcU37b6psDB5tf.97
The Philippine military began what it announced as a final push into Marawi to force out
the Maute Group and Abu Sayaff members who have besieged the city since May. The
military reports not only encountering snipers and the expected IED’s and traps but also
being shot at by women and children. Lieutenant General Carlito Galvez, of the
Philippine forces in western Mindanao claimed that the city should be secure soon but
expects the fighting to become over more intense as the militant groups become
desperate. Asian Correspondent, September 5.
“Fighting Reignites near Marawi Mosque.” ABS-CBN, August 25, 2016. http://news.abscbn.com/news/08/25/17/fighting-reignites-near-marawi-mosque
The Grand Mosque of Marawi was utilized as the main base of operations by the Maute
group. Security forces carefully recaptured the mosque to avoid damaging it yet within a
day fighting renewed as Maute forces moved back into nearby buildings. Marawi has
been under the control of ISIS affiliated militants since May 23 and the death toll has
climbed over 770.
Ness, Marielle. “Beyond the Caliphate: Southeast Asia.” CTC. June 2, 2017.
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/programs-resources/beyond-the-caliphate-2
West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) series, Beyond the Caliphate, provides a
comprehensive look at ISIS affiliated groups operating beyond the central ISIS areas in
the Middle East. This entry looks at the militant groups operating out of Southeast Asia
that have pledged to ISIS, including the Maute group that recently invaded and seized
Marawi.
Goldman, Russell. “The Latest Unrest in the Southern Philippines, Explained.” New York Times,
May 25, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/25/world/asia/philippines-martiallaw-marawi-mindanao.html
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The southern city of Marawi was besieged and occupied by militants linked to ISIS. The
Maute group and Abu Sayyaf launched an attack on the city after the failed attempt by
Philippine security forces to capture Abu Sayyaf’s leader, Isnilon Hapilon. The city is has
been damaged by the groups and several hostages have been taken.
Goldman, Russell. "The Latest Unrest in the Southern Philippines, Explained." New York Times,
March 25, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/25/world/asia/philippines-martiallaw-marawi-mindanao.html.
The southern city of Marawi was besieged and occupied by militants linked to ISIS. The
Maute group and Abu Sayyaf launched an attack on the city after the failed attempt by
Philippine security forces to capture Abu Sayyaf’s leader, Isnilon Hapilon. The city is has
been damaged by the groups and several hostages have been taken.
MORO I SLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT (MILF)
"Moro Islamic Liberation Front." New York Times, October 2017.
https://www.nytimes.com/topic/organization/moro-islamic-liberation-front.
This piece from the New York Times is a chronological compendium of all articles,
commentaries, and analyses published in the New York Times related to MILF.
“Moro Islamic Liberation Front.”, Mapping Militant Organizations Project. Stanford University,
2013. http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/309
This report provides a brief overview of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). After
an opening summary regarding the group, the topics covered are the leadership,
ideology and goals, estimated size of the group, resources, external influences,
locations, targets and tactics, political activities, major attacks, connections with other
groups and relations with the community. This information is presented in numbered
and bulleted lists and short paragraphs. There is a menu on the right of the page that
allows for quick navigation to individual topics in the report.
MILF Fights Against Islamic Extremism
Sarmiento, Bong S. “Strange Bedfellows in Philippine-Islamic State Fight.” Asia Times, October
1, 2017. http://www.atimes.com/article/strange-bedfellows-philippine-islamic-statefight/
The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a once active militant group in the Philippines
for decades had withdrawn from fighting following a peace agreement in 2014 with the
Philippine Government, has joined forces with government troops to fight against the
IS-affiliated Maute Group. With government forces and the MILF have not been fighting
alongside each other they have been coordinating attacks and providing fire support. A
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regional military official stated that the current cooperative actions may serve to
prevent another Marwari scenario
France-Presse, Agence. "10 MILF Fighters Dead in Clashes with ISIS-linked Groups." Rappler,
August 23, 2017. https://www.rappler.com/nation/179780-moro-islamic-liberationfront-isis-alarm-philippines.
Following the Moro Islamic Liberation Front’s commitment to combatting Islamic
extremism in the Philippines, the group has engaged in armed conflict with associates of
ISIS. The Mindanao Island is considered to be the home of MILF, and ISIS is now
challenging that claim. In clashes against ISIS supports, MILF lost 10 of their over 10,000strong fighters.
"Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Philippines' Biggest Muslim Rebel Group, Supports 'Fatwa'
Against Violent Radicalism." The Straits Times, July 4, 2017.
http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/moro-islamic-liberation-front-philippinesbiggest-muslim-rebel-group-supports-fatwa.
MILF leadership has publicly supported a fatwa against violent radicalism. Groups such
as ASG and ISIS are now in the crosshairs of the largest rebel group in the Philippines.
MILF has participated in the liberation of Marawi City, and has vowed to keep
extremism out of their communities.
Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF)
Chalk, Peter. “The Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters: The Newest Obstacles to Peace in the
Southern Philippines?” CTC Sentinel 6 no.11-12 (November, 2013): 15-17.
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-bangsamoro-islamic-freedom-fighters-thenewest-obstacles-to-peace-in-the-southern-philippines
This article from the Combating Terrorism Center’s monthly publication, provides the
background and known capabilities of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF).
The BIFF had been involved in a coordinated attack with Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) against
government troops in September of 2013 in the village of Lamitan on Basilan Island.
The BIFF emerged as a faction of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front due to the concern
of Ustadz Ameril Umbra Kato that the MILF was more open to compromise with the
government. The BIFF is believed to number around 300 members and possess a sizable
array of pistols, machine guns, sniper rifles, heavy weapons, mortars, IED’s and
landmines. The author concludes that BIFF could be a threat to the peace process due
to their mission statement, armament and capabilities and past coordination with ASG
PEACE DEAL WITH GOVERNMENT

“Philippines Signs Landmark Deal to End Muslim Uprising.” BBC, March 27, 2014.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-26766215
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The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) signed a peace deal with the Philippine
government that have originated in 2001, following an initial cease fire in 1997. The deal
sought to provide a greater sense of autonomy to the Muslim areas of Mindanao in a
bid to end the multi-decade long conflict where over 120,000 people had been killed.
DISARMAMENT

“MILF Rebels hand Over Arms in the Philippines” BBC, June 16, 2015.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33144749
Following in the wake of the 2014 peace treaty with the government, members of the
Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIFF) surrendered their weapons and began the
process of being reintegrated into society. They each were given limited funds in order
to obtain education and employment. Only some members of the group disarmed.
BIFF REJECTS PEACE PROCESS

Manlupig, Karlos. “The BIFF-ISIS Connection and Social Media.” Rappler, September 19, 2014.
https://www.rappler.com/nation/69590-biff-isis-connection-social-media
The BIFF separated from the MILF during the 2014 peace treaty and following
disarmament and continued to launch terror attacks. The BIFF spokesperson, Abu Misry
Mama claims that they are in regular contact with ISIS through social media and has an
“alliance” with the group.
MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (MNLF)
“Moro National Liberation Front.” Mapping Militant Organizations Project. Stanford University.
July, 2014. http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/379
This report provides a brief overview of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).
After an opening summary regarding the group, the topics covered are the leadership,
ideology and goals, name changes, estimated size, resources, external influences,
locations, targets and tactics, political activities, major attacks, relationships with other
groups and relationships with the community. This information is presented in
numbered and bulleted lists and short paragraphs. There is a menu on the right of the
page that allows for quick navigation to individual topics in the report.
RAJAH SOLAIMAN MOVEMENT (RSM)
Roggio, Bill. “Philippines Police Detain Terror Group Leader.” The Long War Journal. August,
2009. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/08/philippine_police_de.php
This article in the Long War Journal begins by provides a background on the Rajah
Solaiman Movement. The leader of the Rajah Solaiman Movement, Dinno Amor
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Rosalejos Pareja (aka Khalil Pareja and Abu Jihad) was captured by Philippine police in
2009. The Rajah Solaiman Movement, was founded by Catholic converts to Islam and
while it remains small in numbers it has been responsible for several deadly attacks in
the Philippines. The group has a wider range of movement in highly Catholic areas and
is receiving funds from both the Abu Sayaff Group and Jemaah Islamiyah. In addition, it
is believed that they are sponsored by Saudi sources as well.
“Philippines Terrorism: The Role of Militant Islamic Converts.” International Crisis Group, Asia
Report 110 (2005):1-35. https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=474136
This report conducted by the International Crisis Group on militant Islamic converts
begins with provided a history of Islam in the Philippines arranged by its location. A few
examples of converts carrying out attacks are provided in the next section of the report
and then the Moro Islamic Liberation Front’s (MILF) factionalism and connections to
outside terrorist groups are discussed. The value seen in converts is that they have a
wider network to operate in and can more easily reach out to past Christian associates.
They are able to blend in with the majority population of the country. A primary
example of this presented is the Rajah Solaiman Movement, a group founded by
Catholic converts to Islam. In the conclusion of the report, the International Crisis
Group reiterates the appeal of converts to the MILF and other organizations and offers
recommendations on how to implement counter-terrorism operations while respecting
and preserving human rights.
NEW PEOPLE’S ARMY
Sarmiento, Bong S. "Duterte's Peace Try Falls to Pieces." Asia Times, November 27, 2017.
http://www.atimes.com/article/dutertes-peace-try-falls-pieces/.
The New People’s Army (NPA), a communist militant group that has been operating in
the Philippines for decades, was in peace negotiations with the Philippine government
until they were broken off on November 23. Progress in the negotiations was limited
and the NPA had conducted several attacks during the process as well. The NPA used
the Marawi siege to its advantage, launching attacks and expanding its territory while
the military was occupied.
Spillius, Alex. “Typhoon Haiyan: The Philippines’ Communist Insurgency Explained.” The
Telegraph, 2013.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/philippines/10447524/TyphoonHaiyan-the-Philippines-communist-insurgency-explained.html
This article reports on a series of attacks on aid convoys, in response to Typhoon Haiyan,
by the militant communist group the New People’s Army (NPA). A history is provided of
the origins of the NPA and the government’s crackdown on the organization. The NPA
was greatly reduced but has recently undergone a small resurgence. Current attacks are
mainly limited to small engagements with government troops, occasional kidnapping
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and murders and a destruction of government equipment. The author believes that
even though the NPA is greatly diminished, it still has the ability to continue launching
new attacks and disrupt the aid and rebuilding process.
“New People’s Army.” Mapping Militant Organizations Project. Stanford University. August,
2012. http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/149
This report provides a brief overview of the New People’s Army, the military wing of the
Communist Party of the Philippines. The topics covered are a summary of the
organization, leadership, ideologies and goals, estimated size of the organization,
influence, targets, locations, political activities, and relationship with the community
and with other groups. This information is presented in numbered and bulleted lists
and short paragraphs. There is a menu on the right of the page that allows for quick
navigation to individual topics in the report.

Counter-Terrorism/Law Enforcement
LOCAL RESPONSE AND ANALYSIS
“Philippines.” International Crisis Group. 2017. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-eastasia/philippines
The International Crisis Group is an independent organization that provides reports,
analysis and recommendations regarding different trouble areas/hot spots in the world.
Their mission statement is to help prevent and resolve deadly conflict. The website
allows the user to obtain region and country specific reports through the menu bars
along the top and left side of the page. The reports range in topic from terrorism and
violent attacks to government instability and other factors that could lead to or
contribute to violent conflict or outbreaks. Recent reports made by the International
Crisis Group are listed on each page and contain an overview of the situation and in
some cases provide additional information and recommendations. An additional
resource on the page, the crises watch database, allows the user to search by country
and access a compilation of news reports from outside sites pertaining to a particular
country or multiple countries. All articles are presented chronologically with a summary
of their content.
The site provides a series of in-depth reports on security issues in the Philippines.
Sample titles:
•
The Philippines: Counter-insurgency vs. counter-terrorism in Mindanao, (2008,
May 14)
•
The communist insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and talks, (2011, February
14)
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•
22)
•

The Philippines: Indigenous rights and the MILF peace process, (2011, November
The Philippines: Dismantling rebel groups, (2013, June 19)

Poling, Gregory B. “Manila and Moro Rebels Strike a Deal.” Center for Strategic & International
Studies. October, 2012. http://csis.org/publication/manila-and-moro-rebels-strike-deal
This article written in 2012 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies
describes the preliminary agreement made in 2012 between the Philippine government
and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). This new agreement is seen by the author
as an update on the previous one made in 1989. The previous agreement provided for
the creation of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) is viewed by the
author as dysfunctional, whereas the current one created a self-governing polity. The
article concludes with an evaluation of what this new agreement means for the U.S. and
others.
Ahmed, Akbar. and Frankie Martin. “Deadly drone strike on Muslims in the Southern
Philippines.” The Brookings Institution. 2012.
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/03/05-drones-philippines-ahmed
This opinion piece examines the US’ first strikes in Southeast Asia using Unmanned
Combat Aerial Vehicles. Targeting the heads of the Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah
organizations on the Southern Philippine island of Jolo, the expansion of the US’ drone
war risks enflaming the ongoing conflicts in southern Muslim communities. The Tausug,
a tribal group rooted in honor, revenge, loyalty, and hospitality, has historically been
subordinated by colonialists and the Philippine central government. After 9/11, Manila
labeled the Tausug as having relations with the al-Qaeda-linked Abu Sayyaf Group.
Relationships through clans, local religious leaders, and international bodies are integral
to reconciliation and peace.
U.S. COUNTER-TERRORISM/INSURGENCY POLICY
Watts, Steven.., Jason H. Campbell, Patrick B. Johnston, Sameer Lalwani, and Sarah H. Bana.
Countering others’ Insurgencies: Understanding US Small-Footprint Interventions in Local
Context. Santa Monica, CA: RAND. 2014.
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR513.html
This report by the RAND Corporation evaluates the success rate of U.S. “small-footprint”
programs based on a quantitative analysis of past counter-insurgency programs and
comparison to counter-insurgency programs in the Philippines and Pakistan. Key
findings of the report were that U.S. counter-insurgency programs that are partnered
with local governments work best when the local governments do not operate counter
to U.S. policies/character. An inclusive local government that does not rely on excessive
force was found by the report to have resulted in a more successful program. The
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report also provides advice on how to manage ineffective local partnerships. Additional
findings and recommendations are provided in which it is identified that “smallfootprint” counter-insurgency operations will be long–term and often have to be
augmented with large scale aid programs. It was also advised that local government
security forces need to include members of all local ethnic groups and religions in order
to operate effectively and avoid excessive/abusive actions during counter-insurgency
programs. Recommendations listed in the report for U.S. programs included the need
to find areas of agreement with local governments/partner nations, focus training of
local security forces on quality, not quantity, and make civilian safety a priority.

Operations Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P)
ROLE OF U.S. MILITARY
Maxwell, David S. “Partnership, Respect Guide U.S. Military Role in Philippines. World Politics
Review, February, 2013.
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12685/partnership-respect-guide-u-smilitary-role-in-philippines
David S. Maxwell is a retired Army Special Forces member and is the associate director
for the Center for Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. This article
describes the role of United States in the Philippines through Operation Enduring
Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P). He discusses the supporting role of U.S. forces and
evaluates the primary role of Philippine armed forces in local counter-terrorism
operations. The next phase of the article covers the importance of the assessment by
Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) of the area and the situation there and
its role in forming the OEF-P campaign plan. Maxwell then covers the importance of
understanding unconventional warfare in order to combat it and the challenges OEF-P
faced when dealing with the local media and government.
NON-COMBAT OPERATIONS
Boot, Max., and Richard Bennet. “Treading softly in the Philippines.” The Weekly Standard,
January 5, 2009.
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/015/956zznwj.asp
This article recounts the successes of the Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEFP) and offers it as a case study of low-profile, non-combat operations. The authors, Max
Boot, a senior fellow in national security studies at the Council of Foreign Relations (CFR)
and Richard Bennet, a research associate, also at the CFR spent time in the Philippines
and met with members of OEF-P. The article begins by provided a history of the conflict
by between the Philippine government and the MNLF and its offshoots. The percentage
and geographic concentration of the Muslim population is provided along with their
living conditions. The extreme poverty is seen as a factor in their radicalization and
largely Muslim areas tend to blame the mostly Catholic government for failing to
improve their living conditions. OEF-P faces several obstacles since all U.S. forces are
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prohibited from any combat role whatsoever by the Philippine government. Instead,
the goals of OEF-P, in addition to traditional advisory roles to Philippine armed forces,
are to wean the local population away from insurgent groups. This is completed
through countering insurgent propaganda, providing medical and civil aid and local
development. Overall, the authors conclude that this form of operation has several
advantages in regards to counter-terrorism especially the ability for it to continue on
indefinitely if needed due to the little attention it draws.
ANALYSIS
Munson, Mark. “Has Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines been a success?” Small Wars
Journal. April 5, 2013. http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/has-operation-enduringfreedom-philippines-been-a-success
The Small Wars Journal is a non-profit group designed to enhance knowledge and ideas
for those prosecuting small wars. The article evaluates Operation Enduring FreedomPhilippines (OEF-P) and provides the author’s view as to whether it was a success by
detailing the advisory role of U.S. forces during the operation and making arguments
both for and against its effectiveness. The article concludes with the author describing
the impact of OEF-P.
WHOLE-OF-NATION APPROACH
Beaudette, Fran. “JSOTF-P Uses Whole-of-Nation Approach to Bring Stability to the Philippines.”
Special Warfare, 25 no. 3. (July-September, 2012).
http://www.soc.mil/swcS/SWmag/archive/SW2503/SW2503BringStabilityToThePhilippi
nes.html
This report by Col. Fran Beaudette who commands the 1st Special Forces Group and
JSTOF-P describes the impact of the “whole-nation” approach of the U.S. presence in
the Philippines. Col. Beaudette notes that this style of engagement in protecting the
local populace has received approval by both the government and people. The impact of
the 1960 Muslim insurgency is recounted and how its aftermath created a terrorist
haven in the Philippines allowing for unchecked training camps. However, the close
partnership between U.S. forces and Philippine military and security forces has resulted
in an effective force to combat terrorist/insurgent threats. Aspects of this approach
include the collaboration of forces along with the sharing of ideas, information, and
training has led to what is described as impressive results. Col. Beaudette maintains
that despite the progress made in the Philippines it is essential that the Philippine
government and military forces keep continued pressure on terrorist groups in the
region and areas that serve as training facilities.

Regional Counter-Terrorism/Counter-Insurgency
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REGIONAL G OVERNMENT RESPONSE TO INSURGENCIES
Chalk, Peter., Angel Rabasa, William Rosenau, and Leanne Piggott. The Evolving Terrorist Threat
to Southeast Asia. Santa Monica, CA: RAND. 2009.
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG846.html
This report by RAND Corporation analyses the underlying motives and historical roots of
militants, as well as national and international responses to insurgencies in Southeast
Asia. Taking into account the historical relationships between the central governments
and non-state actors, this report emphasizes the need to enhance local governance in
regions prone to fundamentalism, effectively identify and enact information campaigns
to counter radical ideologies, and to root CT assistance in regional institutions such as
ASEAN. Through these means and by focusing on “smart power” such as public
diplomacy and empowering moderate Muslim leaders, counterterrorism in Southeast
Asia can effectively be understood and implemented to be seen as in the host country’s
own national interest and not just as an extension of US policy interests.
Pauker, Guy J. Government Responses to Armed Insurgency in Southeast Asia: A Comparative
Examination of Failures and Successes and Their Likely Implications for the Future. Santa
Monica, CA: RAND. 1985. http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P7081.html
This paper, presented at a Regional Strategic Studies Program Workshop at the institute
of Southeastern Asian Studies in Singapore. The efforts of various Southeast Asian
governments to deal with Communist, Islamic, and other insurgency groups are
examined. The author determines that counter-insurgency military operations are
successful if paired with social and economic incentives. A history of the conflict in the
area and the local governments’ policies is provided with arguments for both the
perceived success and failures of these policies.

U.S. Policies and Regional Programs
MILITARY
Chang, Felix.K. “Sideways: America’s Pivot and its Military Bases in the Asia-Pacific.” Foreign
Policy Research Institute. April, 2013. http://www.fpri.org/articles/2013/04/sidewaysamericas-pivot-and-its-military-bases-asia-pacific
This report examines the historical developments leading towards to the forward
presence of American military personnel in the Asia-Pacific. In particular, this showcases
the Obama administration’s decisions to “pivot to Asia”, although forces in the political
and security realms have been drawing the US’ engagement in the region for quite some
time. The potential for maritime disputes amidst China’s recent assertive behavior for
territorial and resource control caused Southeast Asian governments to welcome an
increased American military presence, as well as regional and bilateral security
assistance agreements. While budget constraints in the near- and long-terms may cause
consolidation and reconfiguration of American force posture in its overseas military
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installations, it is integral to continue multinational exercises in the region to enhance
interoperability and fluidity during an era of uncertain financial constraints and an
increasingly assertive Beijing attempting to exert regional dominance over its neighbors.
Parthemore, Christine., Jay Gulledge, Michael Horowitz and Nirav Patel. “Uncharted waters:
The US Navy and Navigating Climate Change.” Center for a New American Security.
2008.http://www.cnas.org/publications/working-papers/uncharted-waters-the-u-snavy-and-navigating-climate-change#.UxSuJMqwWrE
This brief delivers insight on the need for the US Navy to adjust to operational and
strategic environments due to climate change over the next 30 years. Policies of energy
efficiency and alternative fuel sources may affect design, operations, and installations of
existing and new vessels. Changes in the littoral operating environment will require
frequent mapping, sampling, and maintenance. Sea-level rises and increased severity of
tropical storms may increase threats to naval bases and other coastal facilities.
Additionally, naval and resource competition may arise as the Arctic’s shipping lanes
begin to develop. The US Navy is capable of benefitting from planning now for the midand long-term effects of climate change and enacting strategic approaches with its allies
to adapt to the changing security environment.

Maritime Security
“Expanded U.S. assistance for maritime capacity building.” U.S. Department of State. December
16, 2013. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/218735.htm
This fact sheet addresses US Secretary of State John Kerry’s commitment of $32.5
million in regional and bilateral assistance to improve Southeast Asia’s maritime
capacity building. Through strengthening information sharing agencies, advancing
training programs, and countering transnational threats, the US is investing in a new era
of regional cooperation for maritime security and law enforcement. The maritime
capacity building project in Southeast Asia will provide the region with adequate
equipment, education, networks, and information resources to ensure the US’ steadfast
commitment as it pivots to Asia. Operating in an area of intensified resource and
geographic disputes, the US’ assistance measures will provide an avenue to ensure
international peace and security where tensions run high.
TRI-BORDER AREA (TBA)
Rabasa, Angel., and Peter Chalk. Non-Traditional Threats and Maritime Domain Awareness in
the Tri-Border Area of Southeast Asia. Santa Monica, CA: RAND. 2012.
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP372.html
The RAND National Research Institute created this report originally for the Secretary of
Defense and it was later approved for public release. The report covers the tri-border
area (TBA) between the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia is a major area for terrorist
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and criminal activity. It is a known transit zone for local and national terrorist groups.
The report provides geospatial and demographic characteristics and a threat assessment
of the TBA. The Philippines Coast Watch System (CWS), which involves U.S. and
Australian assistance, is described and evaluated along with the feasibility of a tri-state
maritime security system. The report concludes with recommendations for the future
development of the CWS.
Comer, Charles. “The Parting of the Sulawesi Sea: U.S. Strategy and Transforming the Terrorist
Triangle.” Military Review. May-June, 2010.
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2010063
0_art012.pdf
This review investigates the T3- “Terrorist Transit Triangle”- around the Sulawesi Sea on
the tri-border region of the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Due to the lack of
governance in the island chains throughout the T3, these provide natural transit routes
for weapons and militants to Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia and the Abu Sayyaf
Group in the Southern Philippines. The lack of coordination between Philippines,
Indonesia, and Malaysia to formulate an official multinational effort of interdiction and
maritime law enforcement are attributed to distrust, corruption, inter-service rivalries,
and a lack of resources both between and among the three governments. All three
governments heavily rely on US assistance for counterterrorism purposes, although aid
distribution has been uneven. Through the political will from the US, as well as among
the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia, the geospatial challenges of the T3 region can
be addressed through an efficient multinational effort.
STRAITS OF MALACCA
Umana, Felipe. “Threat convergence: Transnational security threats in the Straits of Malacca.”
The Fund for Peace. 2012. http://library.fundforpeace.org/ttcvr1213
The Fund for Peace (FFP) is a non-profit research and educational center. This report
discusses the importance of the Straits of Malacca in regards to maritime trade and
commerce and the security concerns associated. Additional concerns are regional
sovereignty and environmental protection. In addition to legitimate commerce, the
Straits of Malacca have become a haven for piracy, black market goods and terrorist and
militant organizations. The report examines the regional and national significance of the
Straits of Malacca, the extent of the threats in the area, local security-measures taken
and recommendations by the FFP.

Smuggling/Drug Trafficking/Criminal Activity
DRUG TRAFFICKING
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Chouvy, Pierre-Arnaud. Southeast Asia’s thriving drug trade. World Politics Review. October 25,
2011. http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/10442/southeast-asias-thrivingdrug-trade
This article surveys the oscillations in illicit opium production in Southeast Asia
throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. Due to environmental and geopolitical factors
of favorable weather, rugged mountains, and lack of power projection from central
governments, the illicit poppy cultivation and insurgents have been sheltered from
national and international interdiction operations. The beginning of the 21st century
saw a steady decrease in cultivation until a significant resurgence in conflict paired with
rising opium prices caused a rise in production. Because of opium’s unique quality of
being the only cash crop in several regions without adequate compensation, bans from
the central government were only effective in the short-term and caused widespread
debt, food insecurity, and poverty. In the absence of alternative crops and avenues to
economic prosperity, not addressing poverty and corruption- the main drivers of opium
production- leads to the ineffectiveness of international counter-narcotics policies in
Southeast Asia.
ILLEGAL WILDLIFE TRADE/A NIMAL SMUGGLING
Fuller, Thomas. “Notorious Figure in Animal Smuggling, Beyond Reach in Laos.” The New York
Times. March 3, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/04/world/asia/notoriousfigure-in-animal-smuggling-beyond-reach-in-laos.html
This article examines the notion of environmental crime and trafficking of wildlife from
Laotian businessman Vixay Keosavang. One of his companies, Xaysavang Trading,
smuggles wildlife from other countries into Laos to merit the legality of their sale as if the
animals were bred in captivity in accordance with Laotian law. The main problem in
enforcing the rule of law in Laos is due to Mr. Vixay’s connections and the larger
trafficking community’s links to influential people. Because of the levels of corruption
and economic benefits for those involved in the trade and laundering of wildlife, law
enforcement agencies in Southeast Asia are inherently at a disadvantage to gather
sufficient evidence and ensure fair judicial proceedings against the perpetrators.
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Map of Malaysia

Malaysia. (30 Jan. 2018). Google Maps. Google. Retrieved from
https://www.google.com/maps/@7.4277549,110.3184221,1853765m/data=!3m1!1e3
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Malaysia
OVERVIEW
"Malaysia: Extremism & Counter Extremism." Counter Extremism Project. January 2018.
https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/malaysia.
The Counter Extremism Project identifies four main insurgent forces that have been
active since 2000. Formerly active Kumpulan Mujadin Malaysia (KMM), the Islamic
State, small cells of the Indonesian based Jemaah Islamiah (JI), and the Philippines based
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Due to Malaysia’s high Muslim population, analysts believe
that it is at an elevated risk for radicalization and terror threats. Malaysia has partnered
with the United States, United Nations, and regional partners in a formal effort to
combat insurgent forces on land, online, and the against the growing threat of piracy at
sea.
"East & Southeast Asia: Malaysia." CIA World Factbook. January 23, 2018.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/my.html.
The CIA Factbook on Malaysia is a thorough encyclopedia of information on the state. It
identifies Jemaah Islamiya (JI) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as foreign
terrorist organizations whose aims are to establish networks in Malaysia, maintain
recruitment and safe havens, prey upon weak communities, and hinder the Malaysian
government. The LTTE are an organization based out of Shri Lanka who is attempting to
extend their reach beyond their territory in Shri Lanka and into other coastal states. The
Factbook also identifies via the International Maritime Bureau that the waters offshore
from Malaysia are “high risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships.”
"CrisisWatch Malaysia." CrisisWatch. January, 2018.
https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/malaysia.
The International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch Malaysia is a compilation of reports,
analyses, and articles that follow the events related to insurgency and terrorism
unfolding in Malaysia. The ICG also rates each country’s status based on the current
events and trending politics of the state. As of January 2018, the ICG assess that the
situation in Malaysia remains “unchanged.” The most recent development was a
December video released by ISIS featuring Muhammad Aqif Heusen Rahizat urging
Muslims to attack their native lands if they cannot join the fight in the holy lands (Syria
and Iraq).
TIMELINE OF MAJOR EVENTS

"Major Extremist and terrorist Incidents." Counter Extremism Project. January 2018.
https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/malaysia#major_extremist_and_terroris
t_incidents.
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This section of the Malaysian Counter Extremism Project Report provides an interactive
scrolling timeline of terror activities starting in 1950. Terror activities in Malaysia pick
up around 2016 when the Islamic State became prevalent in the region.

Regional Terrorist/Insurgent/Militant Groups
ISLAMIC STATE (IS)
For more information the Islamic State in Southeast Asia please see the section on the
Philippines on page 21, and the section on Thailand on page 55.
"ISIS.” Counter Extremism Project. January 2018.
https://www.counterextremism.com/taxonomy/term/3.
The Counter Extremism Project is one of the leading organizations that provides
comprehensive analysis on the state of extremism and militarized armed groups across
the globe. This report, provides an overview of the Islamic State, analyzes its places of
operation, leadership, recruitment strategies, and violent activities. The report also
outlines how foreign nations perceive and interact with the group transnationally.
Fealy, Greg, and John Funston. Indonesian and Malaysian Support for the Islamic State. Report.
January 6, 2016.
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2016/PBAAD863.pdf.
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is an independent
agency of the federal government that focuses on U.S. national security and driving the
development of democratic states while improving the quality of life for people around
the globe. USAID commissioned this report on Indonesia and Malaysia to determine the
population’s susceptibility to the ideologies of ISIS and the impact that the group may
have on the countries. Due to Malaysia and Indonesia’s predominately Muslim
population, the states’ may be at a higher risk of ISIS influence. The report breaks down
risk factors, impacts, counter-terrorism operations, and U.S. interests as a result of the
ISIS threat in Indonesia and Malaysia.
IS RECRUITMENT OPERATIONS IN MALAYSIA

Mohd Sani, Moh Azizuddin. "ISIS Recruitment of Malaysian Youth: Challenge and Response."
Middle East Institute. May 3, 2016. http://www.mei.edu/content/map/isis-recruitmentmalaysian-youth-challenge-and-response.
In 2015 and 2016 the Malaysian Police had arrested more than 160 people suspected of
having ties to ISIS. With the rapid global growth of the Islamic State since 2013, the
Malaysian government-a state with a Muslim majority population-has become
increasingly vigilant about removing extremist propaganda and launching public
education campaigns aimed at preventing radicalization. ISIS’ main target is the
disenchanted impressionable youth of Malaysia. As with many other countries, ISIS had
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seen success recruiting young Muslims through social media campaigns and community
outreach. The daunting challenge for the Malaysian Police and regional counterterrorism outfits is preventing ISIS from indoctrinating citizens before they have further
conflict.
Palansamy, Yiswaree. "In Hunt for Malaysians Joining Islamic State, a Faceless
Menace." Malaymail Online, October 6, 2014.
http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/in-hunt-for-malaysians-joiningislamic-state-a-faceless-menace#m7Fodk6KQJ40Sq8Y.97.
This article from a local Malaysian publication discusses the vulnerability of Malaysia’s
Muslim population to the extreme rhetoric of the Islamic State. The article discusses the
use of social media as a tool to cultivate extreme ideologies and recruit new members
to ISIS. During 2014, ISIS was calling on Muslims from around the globe to come and
fight in Iraq and Syria.
FALLOUT FROM JAKARTA ATTACKS

"Malaysia Says Arrests 7 Islamic State-Linked Militants Suspected of Planning Attacks." Reuters,
January 24, 2016. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-malaysiaarrests/malaysia-says-arrests-7-islamic-state-linked-militants-suspected-of-planningattacks-idUSKCN0V20E1.
Seven Malaysian members of the Islamic State were arrested for planning to launch
attacks across Malaysia at the instruction of a well-known Syria based Malaysian Islamic
State recruiter. One of the arrested members was Bahrun Naim, the mastermind behind
the suicide attacks in Jakarta which killed seven and wounded over 30 people.
Ngui, Yantoultra, and Celine Fernandez. "Malaysia Arrests after Jakarta Attack Fuel Fears of Islamic
State’s Reach." Wall Street Journal, January 16, 2016. https://www.wsj.com/articles/malaysiaarrests-suspected-islamic-state-militants-1452931418.

Following the arrest of four suspected Islamic State associates whom were planning an
attack in Malaysia, government officials now fear that the Islamic State’s reach has
made it to Southeast Asia. The country’s population, the majority of whom are Muslim,
have long been impacted by Islamic extremism. JI and Abu Sayyaf Group cells have
targeted nations such as Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines for their extensive
networks because of the religious associations. Similarly, the Islamic State has regional
governments vigilant as they try to capitalize on their success following their statement
attack against Jakarta.
JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH (JI)
For more information on Jemaah Islamiyah, please see the section on Indonesia on page 7.

39

"Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)." Counter Extremism Project. January 2018.
https://www.counterextremism.com/taxonomy/term/152.
The CEP identifies JI as an Indonesian based Islamic insurgency that has operational ties
to Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Cambodia, and Thailand. Their primary
motivation is to establish an Islamic caliphate in Southeast Asia through violence. JI
seeks to accomplish this goal through what CEP identifies as a “three-phase strategy of
violent jihad.” First, destabilize the local government. Second, undermine the efforts of
regional governments and infrastructure. Third, use its extensive networks with other
terrorist organizations with similar ideologies to launch a global jihad. The organization
is primarily funded through donations, criminal enterprises, and money laundering
through front companies. The organization has a history of violent aggression since the
mid-nineties until it pledged its allegiance to ISIS (see previous sections on JI activities
that details the relationship and fallout with ISIS).
Golburt, Yanina. "An In‐depth Look at the Jemaah Islamiyah Network." Al Nakhlah, no. 2 (Fall
2004): 1-9.
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/~/media/Fletcher/Microsites/al%20Nakhlah/archives/pdfs/gol
burt.pdf.
JI, established in 1995 (according to this source – others suggest 1993) by Abdullah
Sungkar created the organization to create an Islamic State in Southeast Asia that
included the territory of Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore.
The organization was founded off of the radical Saudi Arabian tradition of Wahhabism,
similar to that of al-Qaeda, and other radical Islamic movements founded in the Middle
East. The article discusses the structure of the organization as one that is
compartmentalized and able to “regenerate” to ensure longevity. Many of the
leadership are former Afghan fighters and with them, came experienced leadership and
training. The group maintained ties with Al Qaeda and put value on maintaining
relationships with other organizations across Asia that had similar ideologies. This made
them able to easily recruit new members across borders, and establish themselves as a
serious player among radical insurgent groups.
ABU SAYYAF G ROUP (ASG)
For more information on ASG please visit the section on the Philippines on page 18.
"Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).” Counter Extremism Project. January 2018.
https://www.counterextremism.com/taxonomy/term/409.
The Counter Extremism Project is one of the leading organizations that provides
comprehensive analysis on the state of extremism and militarized armed groups across
the globe. This report, examines the prevalent threat of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) an
Islamic extremist group based in the Philippines and Malaysia. ASG’s main goal is to
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establish an Islamic State in Southeast Asia. ASG makes much of its income through
organized crime, kidnapping, foreign funders such as Al-Qaeda and JI, and extortion.
ASG’s known activities date back to the late 80’s and the group became increasingly
active in 2014 during the rise of the Islamic State.
KUMPULAN MUJAHIDIN MALAYSIA (KMM)
"Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) Malaysian Mujahideen Movement." Global Security.
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/kmm.htm.
The report by Global Security details the basic structure and events associated with the
KMM in the early 2000’s. The KMM is a formerly active insurgent group that operated
out of Malaysia and neighboring countries in Southeast Asia. The group, similar to JI
wanted to create a caliphate in Southeast Asia. The KMM was likely absorbed by other
groups such as the JI and the Islamic State, but were an active and disruptive insurgent
group until the mid-2000’s.
Aslam, Mohd Mizan. "Cross Border Terrorism: The Link Between Malaysia Militant Group

(KMM) & Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) - Connection and the Implications for Regional Security."
LinkedIn Article. April 17, 2016. https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/cross-border-terrorism-

link-between-malaysia-militant-aslam/.
This article written by Universiti Malayia Perlis Scholar Mohd Mizan Aslam details the
relationship between the KMM and JI in Indonesia and Malaysia. The article discusses
how Indonesia and Malaysia became footholds for extremism in Southeast Asia. The
relationship between JI and the KMM was born out of the close proximity, similar
ideologies, and JI’s desire to maintain an extensive network of partnerships with other
insurgencies. Both groups were encouraged to train with Afghans who had been battle
tested by years of conflict with Russia and JI had much of their leadership from that
legacy group of Afghan fighters. These relationships allowed for both groups to
participate in cross border activities and the task was made easier by the ability to move
freely between Indonesia and Malaysia by virtue of being Muslims due to the
Immigration Law of the two countries. Until recently, cooperation between the two
countries made cross border insurgency even more possible. The growth of groups such
as JI and the Islamic State has forced the governments of Malaysia and Indonesia to
participate in regional counter-terrorist operations and extensive intelligence sharing.
COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IN MALAYSIA – C OMMUNIST PARTY OF MALAYSIA (CPM)
Kheng, Cheah Boon. "The Communist Insurgency in Malaysia, 1948-90: Contesting the NationState and Social Change." New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies11, no. 1 (June 2009):
132-52. http://www.nzasia.org.nz/downloads/NZJAS-June09/14_Cheah_3.pdf.
This publication in the New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies examines the communist
insurgency in Malaysia from 1948 – 1990. The article covers the political events and
turmoil that led to the domestic strife and riots that eventually became the insurgency
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in Malaysia. The role of the education system, foreign politics, and economic struggles
are also explored as motivations for the violent communist insurrection that
unintendedly helped create an authoritarian regime and lasting impact on the nation of
Malaysia.
ORGANIZED C RIME ACTIVITIES
Trafficking in Persons Report. Report. U.S. Department of State. June 2017.
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/271343.pdf.
This report by the U.S. State Department outlines the prominence of human trafficking
in Malaysia. Trafficking takes many forms in Malaysia, forced labor and sex trafficking
are the two most common. The trafficking problem is exacerbated by the over 150,000
registered refugees that have no formal status in Malaysia. This is the population that
many of the traffickers prey upon. Additionally, traffickers are used by extremist groups
for funding their insurgency operations and as labor. The state department profiles
Malaysia as a tier two country that is trending upwards due to international cooperation
and increased emphasis on policing trafficking.
Haas, Brenda. "Unexplained Abductions in Malaysia Raise Concerns." Deutsche Welle, May 23,
2017. http://www.dw.com/en/unexplained-abductions-in-malaysia-raise-concerns/a38954316.
One of the main threats to foreign travelers and business people in Southeast Asia has
been kidnapping for ransom. It is one of the main means that many criminal
organizations and extremist groups fund their operations in the region. Malaysia has
recently been the victim of a new wave of disappearances. Four pastors and local
community workers have gone missing. What sets these kidnappings apart is that there
is rarely a ransom asked, and there appears to be a distinct pattern. Malaysians in the
effected community believe the kidnapped to be targets of “religious vigilantism,” one
pastors family claims that his desire to preach Christianity may be the reason he was
taken.

Malaysian Counter-Terrorism Operations
MALAYSIAN CT OPERATIONS AND INITIATIVES
Mazumdaru, Srinivas. "Malaysia Steps Up Security to Counter Terror Threat." Deutsche Welle,
January 21, 2016. http://www.dw.com/en/malaysia-steps-up-security-to-counterterror-threat/a-18996395.
Following the attacks in Jakarta, Malaysia raised their alert level to its highest possible
level in expectation of a regional wave of attacks from other members of the Islamic
State and its associated groups. Regional groups such as IS, JI, Abu Sayyaf, and MNLF
pose a significant threat to Malaysia, and the attack on Jakarta demonstrated a security
vulnerability in their counterinsurgency efforts that the government wants to defend
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against. In addition to added security and more vigilant checkpoints Malaysia is also
actively defending against extremist propaganda and website that may try to incite
action against the state. This is done not just by taking down jihadist literature from
websites, but also by promoting an “enlightened version of Islam.”
Singh, Bilveer. "Prevention of Terrorism: Relevance of POTA in Malaysia." RSIS Commentary.
March 31, 2015. http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/CO15075.pdf.
This commentary examines the effectiveness of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA)
in Malaysia. Proponents of the act appreciate that the act gives the government the
ability to only detain suspected terrorists and foreign fighters returning home following
their time fighting for groups such as ISIS. The act also gives Malaysian CT forces the
ability to act proactively rather than react to events after they happen. Opponents
suggest that the POTA gives the government too much power to arrest and detain
political opponents and not just members of the Islamic State and other Malaysian
extremists.
INTERNATIONAL-MALAYSIAN CT OPERATIONS AND INITIATIVES
Leong, Trinna . "Malaysia Creates Anti-terror Force for Quick Response." The Straits Times,
October 28, 2016. http://www.straitstimes.com/world/malaysia-creates-anti-terrorforce-for-quick-response.
A new 170 member joint anti-terror unit comprising police officers, armed forces, and
the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency will form the National Special Operations
Force (NSOF). It will act as the nation’s primary deterrent against terrorist activities in
the land, air, and water. NSOF is a reaction to the increased threat of ISIS violence and
lone-wolf terror attacks in Malaysia and throughout Southeast Asia. The NSOF is the first
anti-terror force in Malaysia to involve multiple agencies.
Ray, Bihu. "Malaysian Police Arrest 16 Terror Suspects in Nationwide Crackdown." International
Business Times, October 10, 2016. http://www.ibtimes.sg/malaysian-police-arrest-16terror-suspects-nationwide-crackdown-3827.
Sixteen suspected terrorists associated with the Islamic State were arrested by
Malaysian Police and anti-terror forces. Fourteen of the individuals were in a cell
headed by Muhammad Wanndy Muhammad Jedi. The arrests come following
nationwide security enhancements after an attack by ISIS militants in Jakarta.
European Union. EU External Action. "European Union-Malaysia Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement Initialed Today." News release, June 04, 2016. European Union.
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquartershomepage_en/5348/European%20Union%E2%80%93Malaysia%20Partnership%20and%
20Cooperation%20Agreement%20initialled%20today.
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The European Union and Malaysia agreed to a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
(PCA) that would provide a legal framework for strengthening bilateral cooperation
between the two entities. One of the PCA’s main foci was on counter-terrorism
operations and intelligence sharing. Additionally, the PCA would cover issues such as
human rights, international justice, cybersecurity, combating organized crime, and the
illegal drug trade.
United Nations. Security Council. "Action against Threat of Foreign Terrorist Fighters Must Be
Ramped Up, Security Council Urges in High-Level Meeting." News release, May 29, 2015.
United Nations. http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11912.doc.htm.
The United Nations Security Council met with foreign leaders to address the growing
threat of international terrorism and foreign fighters. Malaysia addressed the council,
presenting the effective methodology they had used to prevent, detain, and monitor
those that had engaged in terrorist activities or were leaving to fight for ISIS in the
Middle East. The Malaysian counter-terrorism efforts were not just focused on
engagement; much of their effort was proactive and focused on the prevention of
radicalization.
BACKLASH AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF ENHANCED
SECURITY MEASURES

"Creating a Culture of Fear: The Criminalization of Peaceful Expression in Malaysia." Human
Rights Watch. October 26, 2015. https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/10/26/creating-culturefear/criminalization-peaceful-expression-malaysia.

This report from the legal team at the Human Rights Watch is intended to shed light on
the policies targeting speech and expression in Malaysia. According to the report,
freedom of expression in Malaysia is under attack by legislation intended to limit the
ability political opposition groups and Islamic extremists to spread propaganda and
undermine the government. Critics claim that the Sedition Act is a tool of repression,
wielded by the government to silence and limit political opposition groups. These
groups were not the only ones impacted under the guise of protecting against extreme
rhetoric according to the article, journalists and scholars were also at the mercy of the
Sedition Act. The report ends with recommendations to each of the concerned parties
based on the current legal framework in Malaysia. The recommendations shed light on
the position of each group, and policy guidelines that may improve the deteriorating
situation in Malaysia.

Maritime Security
Espenilla, Jacqueline. "Abductions at Sea: A 3-Way Security Challenge for Indonesia, Malaysia,
and the Philippines." The Diplomat, May 05, 2016.
https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/abductions-at-sea-a-3-way-security-challenge-forindonesia-malaysia-and-the-philippines/.
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Piracy in the tri-border area of Southeast Asia continues to be a problem. A large
majority of this activity occurs in the Straits of Malacca (SOM). The lack of information
sharing and regional cooperation between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines may
be to blame. Abductions at sea, piracy, and armed robbery against ships at port
committed by members of Abu Sayyaf pose significant problems to the economic and
political stability of the region. The security challenges posed by Southeast Asian waters
in the tri-border area limit the ability of any one state to effectively police piracy alone.
The insurgency at sea is a problem that all three states must face, and may only be
effectively mitigated together.
Moss, Trefor. "Indonesia Calls for Joint Maritime Patrols to Combat Islamic Militants." Wall
Street Journal, April 26, 2016. https://www.wsj.com/articles/indonesia-calls-for-jointmaritime-patrols-to-combat-islamic-militants-1461672113.
The capture and beheading of a Canadian citizen spurred Indonesia to call on its
neighbors to participate in joint maritime patrols and anti-piracy operations. Violence in
the waters of the tri-border area highlighted by kidnappings by Abu Sayyaf has spurred
the need for enhanced maritime security. The waters are also known to be used for the
trafficking of persons and drugs as it is a source of income for many of the insurgent
organizations operating out of Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia.

45

Map of Thailand

Thailand.
(1 Feb. 2014).
Google
Maps.Google
Google. Maps.
Retrieved
from Retrieved from
Indonesia
(13 Nov.
2014).
Google.

https://www.google.com/maps/place/Thailand/@15.3968588,98.6666411,1638177m/data=!3m1!1e3!4
https://www.google.com/maps/@-1.297215,113.4006045,4499316m/data=!3m1!1e3
m5!3m4!1s0x304d8df747424db1:0x9ed72c880757e802!8m2!3d15.870032!4d100.992541.

46

Thailand
CONFLICT OVERVIEW
"CrisisWatch Malaysia." CrisisWatch. January, 2018.
https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/thailand.
International Crisis Group’s (ICG) CrisisWatch identifies Thailand as a country with an
“Unchanged Situation” since the summer of 2017. The country still battles issues such as
human trafficking, the illegal drug trade, a southern umbreal organization insurgency,
and recent political corruption that has led to riots and protests in January 2018. The
Thailand profile offers latest news, reports and briefings, and commentary by ICG
analysts.
"Thailand: Extremism & Counter Extremism." Counter Extremism Project. January 2018.
https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/Thailand.
The Counter Extremism Project identifies that there are multiple regional and global
insurgency groups operating in Thailand at varying levels of activity. The most
prominent anti-government insurgency group is the Malay-Muslim insurgency in
southern Thailand. The century old conflict between the Malay-Muslims and the Thai
government stems from ethnic fractionalization, strong nationalism, and a desire for the
southern provinces to gain independence from the Thai government. Global terrorist
groups such as al-Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyyah, Hezbollah, and ISIS have also operated in a
limited capacity out of Thailand. “The insurgency is believed to lack centralized
leadership and organization structure” there are instead small sub factions that operate
under an umbrella organization. Thailand runs extensive counterextremism operations
in an effort to prevent groups such as ISIS and AQ from establishing a base of operations
out of Thailand. This effort has been largely successful as few foreign fighters have come
from the state that has declared martial law on the southern provinces where the
Muslim separatists operate out of.
Abuza, Zachary. "No End in Sight for Thailand's Deadly Southern Insurgency." The Diplomat, July
18, 2017. https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/no-end-in-sight-for-thailands-deadlysouthern-insurgency/.
This article by well-known Southeast Asia scholar and Jamestown contributor Zachary
Abuza examines the trends of violence in Thailand’s southern provinces. His conclusion
is that while attempts at peace have repeatedly failed in the past, without a formal
agreement the resolve of the Malay-Muslim insurgents will remain unwavering. The
BRN insurgents will continue to launch attacks against Thai government forces and key
infrastructure, and escalate violence until a peace agreement (usually a cease fire with
mutually agreeable terms) is formed between the two groups. If the Thai government
decides to forgo another attempt at peace, the BRN may be forced to leave their
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homelands in the south and take the fight to neighboring provinces where they have
less influence.
Nurakkate, Chumphot. "The Conflict in Southern Thailand." Center for Defence and Strategic
Studies, March 2012, 1-20.
http://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/Shedden/2012/SheddenPapers12_12030
6_ConflictinThailand_Nurakkate.pdf.
This publication claims that the southern Malay-Muslim insurgency is about two things,
“territory and identity.” A desire to reclaim their lost independent Patani state driving
the insurgency. The BRN insurgents representing the Muslim minority in Thailand are
the most influential and largest actor in the region. Most splinter insurgency groups
operating in Thailand such as JI cells and others fall under the BRN umbrella and share
their ideological goals. This article breaks down the causes of conflict between the BRN
and the Thai government, and the challenging future that an entrenched insurgency
poses to Thailand.
Abuza, Zachary. "The Ongoing Insurgency in Southern Thailand: Trends in Violence,
Counterinsurgency Operations, and the Impact of National Politics." Strategic
Perspective 6 (September 01, 2011): 1-48.
http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/717913/the-ongoing-insurgency-insouthern-thailand-trends-in-violence-counterinsurgenc/.
The Malay-Muslim insurgency in Thailand’s southern provinces has been the source of
armed conflict and political strife since the early-2000s. Attacks targeting government
forces, political opposition groups, and state sponsored infrastructure in an effort to
destabilize the Thai governance in the south has highlighted the effort of the southern
separatists. Counterinsurgency operations launched by the Thai government have been
largely ineffective due to the Muslim majority in southern Thailand. The author suggests
that U.S. objectives in Thailand should start with assisting counterinsurgency and
stability operations, and through careful economic investment.
BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
Bajoria, J., & Zissis, C. “Backgrounder: The Muslim insurgency in Southern Thailand.”
Council on Foreign Relations. September, 2008. http://www.cfr.org/thailand/musliminsurgency-southern-thailand/p12531
Since the insurgency official began in 2004, the conflict has been responsible for the
deaths of over 3,000 people. This article examines the history of the Malay-Muslim
population in Thailand, their tenuous relationship with the Thai government, and their
motivations for forming the separatist movement.
Houben, V. J. H. (2003). Southeast Asia and Islam. Annals of the American Academy of Political
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and Social Science, 588, 149–170.
Seeks to identify the characteristics of Islam in Southeast Asia. Reviews the spread of
the religion in the region and the modern political contexts in which it exists there,
giving particular attention to developments in Indonesia, Malaysia, South Thailand, and
the Philippines. Addresses some of the most pressing aspects of modern Southeast
Asian Islam, including “the nature of Islamic revivalism, current outbreaks of ethnoreligious conflict, and the possible threat of extremism.”
TIMELINE OF MAJOR EVENTS

"Thailand profile - timeline." BBC News. January 09, 2018.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-15641745.
This article from BBC is a chronology of key events from the 7th century AD to 2017. The
events covered are the rise of modern Thailand, post-ww2 uncertainty, political and
financial turmoil, coup, and peace movements.
"Thailand: Conflict Timeline." Peace Insight. 2011.
https://www.peaceinsight.org/conflicts/thailand/conflict-profile/conflict-timeline/.
Peace Insight takes key events from BBC and Reuters to compile a chronology of conflict
in Thailand from 1902 to February of 2011.

Regional Terrorist/Insurgent/Militant Groups
MUSLIM SEPARATISTS AND THE SOUTHERN INSURGENCY – UMBRELLA FOR MALAY-MUSLIM INSURGENCY
"Jihadism in Southern Thailand: A Phantom Menace." International Crisis Group. November 8,
2017. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/thailand/291-jihadismsouthern-thailand-phantom-menace.
This analysis by ICG is a holistic contemporary review of the Malay-Muslim insurgency in
southern Thailand. The article explains the reason behind the Malay-Muslim immunity
to transnational Jihad influence from groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda, and attributes it
to the difference in goals and ideology. For the Malay-Muslims, they pursue “selfdetermination over a specific territory, seeking to join, rather than destroy, the
international system.” Using tactics such as those employed by AQ or ISIS would
discredit their legitimacy in the international community. The Malay-Muslims in Patani
are driven by a strong sense of community and nationalism. Their unique resistance to
Islamic extremism in a region where ISIS has infiltrated many of the neighboring Muslim
communities speaks to the resolution of the Malay-Muslims. Risk still exists, Malaysian
jihadists and ISIS supporters could see southern Thailand as a safe haven from
counterinsurgency efforts, and more exposure to radical groups could cause splinter
factions from the Malay-Muslim insurgency to form.
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"Thailand: Malay-Muslim Insurgency and the Dangers of Intractability." International Crisis
Group. July 20, 2017. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-eastasia/thailand/thailand-malay-muslim-insurgency-and-dangers-intractability.
This commentary from experts at the ICG examines the potential link between the
Malay-Muslim insurgency and foreign jihadist ideologies. ICG cautions that instability
and dissatisfaction from Thailand’s use of martial law in its predominantly Muslim
southern provinces may result in openings for foreign jihadists associated with ISIS, JI or
AQ who seek to capitalize on populations that may have vulnerabilities to radicalization.
Malay-Muslims have seldom resorted to tactics used by jihadists, and with the threat of
transnational terror higher than ever, ICG is urging the European Union to encourage
the Thai government to restore civil liberties in the southern provinces and seek peace.
"Violence in Southern Thailand - BRI." Thompson Reuters Foundation News, August 8, 2013.
http://news.trust.org//spotlight/Thailands-southern-violence/?tab=briefing.
Violence among Thailand’s southern Muslim Separatist movement which started in the
mid-2000s has flared once more as bombings, targeted attacks, and assassinations have
led to the Thai government declaring martial law. Muslims, while the minority
population to Buddhists in Thailand, largely dominate the southern provinces of
Thailand where cultural ties are closer shared with neighboring Malaysia. Poverty in the
southern provinces and accusations against the government of unequal treatment and
brutality has only furthered the divide between the Muslim minority and the
government. The Muslim minority that held onto its independence for nearly 500 years,
in what is now the southern provinces of Thailand in a sultanate called Patani. It is this
alienation and desire to be independent under Muslim authority that drives the
southern separatist movement.
Liow, Joseph Chinyong, and Don Pathan. Confronting Ghosts: Thailand's Shapeless Southern
Insurgency. Report. Lowy Institute for International Policy. Longueville Media, 2010. 166.
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/pubfiles/Liow_and_Pathan,_Confronti
ng_ghosts_web_1.pdf
This monograph analyzes the Malay-Muslim southern insurgency during its height and
transformation in 2010. The article argues that while the insurgency continues to be
motivated by a historical pursuit of independence, the Malay-Muslim insurgency has
changed from a hierarchical structured organization to a “fluid and shapeless” one. This,
coupled with individual provincial motivations and self-interests has led to the MalayMuslim separatists away from being a “monolithic insurgent movement” and towards
an umbrella organization with separate divisions and sub-factions.
Chalk, Peter. The Malay-Muslim Insurgency in Southern Thailand -- Understanding the Conflict's
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Evolving Dynamic.Report no. Paper 5. Rand Corporation. 2008.
https://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP198.html.
This report by the Rand Corporation describes the unrest in the provinces of southern
Thailand caused by the Malay-Muslim insurgency and retaliatory actions by the Thai
government. While the violence by the southern insurgents is being committed by the
Muslim minority population, there appears to be no indication that transnational
jihadism has found a new foundation in Thailand among the Malay-Muslims that is
spurring the attacks. The conflict though growing in scale and sophistication, has not
migrated north, targeted tourists or noncombatants, or the U.S. it appears to be a civil
conflict between the government and a population that feels underrepresented.
Storey, Ian. "Malaysia’s Role in Thailand’s Southern Insurgency." Jamestown Foundation. March
15, 2007. https://jamestown.org/program/malaysias-role-in-thailands-southerninsurgency/.
The southern separatist insurgency by the Muslim minority population in Thailand has
ushered in a cooperation resolution between the Malaysian and Thai governments. The
insurgency in the southern provinces of Thailand share a land border with the Malaysian
states of Kelantan, Perak, Perlis and Kedah. Even though the Malay-Muslims of southern
Thailand are ethnically similar to the Muslim majority of Malaysia, the Malaysian
government seeks to stabilize its neighbor to prevent further conflict from spilling over
into their territory. Due to their close cultural ties with the southern separatist
population, Malaysia in addition to counterinsurgency cooperation and border security,
may be a powerful mediating force between the Thai government and the insurgents.
SOUTHERN INSURGENCY MAJOR SUB FACTIONS AND LEADERSHIP
Abuza, Zachary. "A Breakdown of Southern Thailand's Insurgent Groups." The Jamestown
Foundation. September 8, 2006. https://jamestown.org/program/a-breakdown-ofsouthern-thailands-insurgent-groups/.
ISLAMIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PATANI (BIPP)
LEADERSHIP

"Islamic Front for the Liberation of Patani (BIPP)." Tracking Terrorism & Analysis Center. 2017.
https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/islamic-front-liberation-patani-bipp.
BIPP the umbrella organization for six factions of the southern Thailand Insurgency. The
groups associated with BIPP are the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), Runda Kumpulan
Kecil (RKK), Gerakan Mujahidin islam Patani (GIMP), Patani United Liberation
Organization (PULO), Barisam Islam Pembebasan Patan (BIPP), and Jemaah Islamiyah.
The group’s founder is identified as Tengku Abdul Jalal aka Adul na Saiburi.
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BARISAN REVOLUSI NASIONAL (BRN) AND RUNDA KUMPULAN
KECIL (RKK) LEADERSHIP

"Ex-Headmaster Becomes Top BRN Rebel Leader in Deep South: Thai Officials." Benar News,
March 20, 2017. https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/thai/brn-leader03202017163737.html.
Following the death of Sapae-in Baso, Doonloh Wae-mano aka Abdullah Wan Mat Noor
was selected as the new leader of the largest rebel group in the Malay-Muslim
insurgency in southern Thailand. He will take over the militant group of over 6,000
following his unanimous selection by the BRN council. Doonloh is considered to be a
hardliner who may not be able to control the Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK) the frontlines
combat unit of the BRN.
“Thai Deep South: An elusive Leader, an Enduring Narrative.” Benar News, February 28, 2017.
https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/far-south-view/pathan-leader02282017114138.html
The article explores the impact of the death of BRN leader Sapae-ing Baso. According to
BRN leadership, nothing changes. The narrative and motivation of an independent
Patani state which drives the group will continue to live on, and new elections will bring
a leader that will carry on that legacy. The question is, who will the new leader be?
“Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN).” Tracking Terrorism & Analysis Center. 2017.
https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/barisan-revolusi-nasional-brn
BRN is the largest armed rebel group that is part of the umbrella southern MalayMuslim insurgency. The organization’s founder is Abdul Karim Hassan. Unlike many of
the other organizations, BRN is considered to have a distinct hierarchy and strong
centralized core leadership. The leadership reportedly consists of Abdullah Wan Mat
Noor, Jekupeng Buraso, Harun Yaacob, Amin Tohmeena, Yalan Abdulroman, and Masae
U-Seng.
PATANI MALAY NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY FRONT (BRNAFFILIATE) LEADERSHIP

“Patani Malay National revolution Front-Coordinate / BRN-Coordinate.” Tracking Terrorism &
Analysis Center. 2017. https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/patani-malay-nationalrevolutionary-front-coordinate-brn-coordinate
The BRN-Coordinate is one of many groups that is made up of multiple underground
cells that assist the RKK and BRN leadership. Their known leadership is made up of Ustaz
Karim Haji Hassan, and Rosa Burako.
PEACE TALKS
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Bodetti, Austin. "Will Southern Thailand Turn to Jihad?" The Diplomat. November 20, 2017.
https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/will-southern-thailand-turn-to-jihad/.
The article from the Diplomat builds off of a previously mentioned article from the ICG
Jihadism in Southern Thailand: A Phantom Menace. The continuing conflict with the
Malay-Muslim insurgency has only created more discontent and widened the divide
between the government and the minority population. As the contempt for the
government grows, transnational jihadist groups could exploit this relationship to
encourage Malay-Muslims to turn to jihadist tactics. With the growth of ISIS into
neighboring Malaysia and the Philippines, southern Thailand remains vulnerable to
extremism. The solution to this problem, may be through peace rather than continued
conflict. Each side in the conflict has a vested interest in keeping AQ and ISIS out of the
conflict, and to ensure that jihadism does not expand into southern Thailand the two
sides must bridge the gap.
Phaicharoen, Nontarat, and Mariyam Ahmad. "Peace Negotiations with Southern Separatist
Rebels Will Proceed." Tracking Terrorism & Analysis Consortium. November 1, 2017.
https://www.trackingterrorism.org/chatter/peace-negotiations-southern-separatistrebels-will-proceed-bangkok-thailand-01-november-2017.
Two-year old peace negotiations between the southern Malay-Muslim insurgents and
the Thai government are set to continue despite resumed hostilities between militants
and government forces. The Malay-Muslims have been through peace talks with the
Thai government in the past, but there has been no lasting resolution to the conflict that
satisfies both sides. Cease fires, safety zones, and agreements over ensuring
noncombatants remain unharmed has deescalated the conflict, but, in the year since
last October 223 government soldiers, policemen, and defense volunteers have been
killed in insurgent attacks in the southern provinces. In decade since the conflict was
renewed, nearly 7,000 people have been killed in the southern Malay-Muslim provinces.
This article is also available via:
https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/thai/thailand-bombings11012017164103.html
Hariraksapitak, Pracha. "Thai Junta Rejects Conditional Peace Talks with Muslim
Insurgents." Reuters, April 11, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-thailandinsurgency/thai-junta-rejects-conditional-peace-talks-with-muslim-insurgentsidUSKBN17D137.
In the wake of an upsurge of attacks across Thailand’s three volatile southernmost
border provinces, the region’s foremost Malay-Muslim separatist faction, the Barisan
Revolusi Nasional, has declared ongoing peace talks null and void - and that
international mediation is the only path to a resolution. Prime Minister Prayuth Chan53

ocha rejected the offer and said peace talks were an internal matter and required no
international mediation or observation.
"Southern Thailand's Peace Dialogue: No Traction." International Crisis Group. September 21,
2016. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/thailand/southern-thailand-speace-dialogue-no-traction.
This article from ICG takes a chronological approach to the peace process in Thailand. It
identifies the events in the conflict between the Thai government and southern
insurgents that have acted as the causal mechanisms for the groups to engage in peace
talks. ICG breaks down each event and treats them as case studies for how each party’s
action created a reaction in the other. The findings suggest that the decade old conflict
shows no sign of stopping. Perhaps the best approach to peace with the southern
separatists is for the Thai government to decentralize power and allow for regional
governance in the Muslim minority provinces to avoid the divisions caused by ethnic
fractionalization.
Abuza, Zachary. "The Upcoming Peace Talks in Southern Thailand’s Insurgency." Combating
Terrorism Center Sentinel 6, no. 3 (March 2013). https://ctc.usma.edu/the-upcomingpeace-talks-in-southern-thailands-insurgency/.
As the southern separatists and government of Thailand approach the negotiating table
following a political agreement that temporarily ends the violence in southern Thailand,
this CTC Sentinel article looks to where the peace process is going. Formal talks between
the leadership of the Thai government and Malay-Muslims are set to begin March 28th,
and there still exist a number of challenges that may prevent negotiations from making
headway. Continued violence since the February cease fire will need to stop in order to
make any headway. The problem facing BRN leadership is that the southern separatists
are an umbrella made up of many organizations, each with their own unique
motivations that may be difficult for the BRN to control. Another challenge is that the
militants are succeeding in their efforts to hinder military and government operations,
which lessens the incentive to come to an agreement. What is significant for the
progress of the conflict is that this is the first time since the conflict started that both
sides will come to the negotiating table to discuss peace.
Davis, Anthony. "Thai Insurgency Enters New Phase." Asia Times, October 23, 2013.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/SEA-01-231013.html.
Violence across Thailand’s southern provinces has indefinitely suspended the fragile
peace talks between the southern separatists and the Thai government. The Patani
Malay National Revolutionary Front (BRN) launched a wave of attacks against
government facilities and outposts in the southern provinces in response to increased
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operations against BRN leadership and communities. The BRN’s willingness to engage in
peace talks, consolidation and organization, and political campaign indicates that the
separatist movement is looking to strategically change how it conducts its insurgency in
order to achieve long-term gains.
ISLAMIC STATE (ISIS)
For more information on the Islamic State in Southeast Asia, please see the Philippines section
on page 21.
"ISIS.” Counter Extremism Project. January 2018.
https://www.counterextremism.com/taxonomy/term/3.
See the ISIS annotation on page 40 in the Philippines section of this document.
Crispin, Shawn W. "Islamic State in Thailand a Phantom Threat." The Diplomat, March 4, 2016.
https://thediplomat.com/2016/03/islamic-state-in-thailand-a-phantom-threat/.
ISIS operations in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines have led to speculation that
Thailand may be the next target. Thailand is already engaged in conflict with a Muslim
separatist insurgency at their southern borders and officials fear that they could be a
vulnerable population for radicalization. Though the fear exists, analysts suggest that
the Malay-Muslim population would not bend to ISIS. Their movement is based on their
desire to be recognized by the international community, and affiliating with ISIS would
jeopardize their claim over the southern provinces. It has been confirmed that foreign
ISIS fighters have used Bangkok for transit to and from the Middle East; however,
neither ISIS nor AQ are known to have any stronghold or safe haven in Thailand.
Arpon, Yasmin Lee. "Conflict in Thai South Could be Exploited by ISIS, Warn Analysts." The
Straits Times, June 10, 2017. http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/conflict-in-thaisouth-could-be-exploited-by-isis-warn-analysts.
ISIS, known for exploiting vulnerable populations where ethnic groups are in conflict
with local government forces may try and prey on the opportunity presented by the
southern Malay-Muslim insurgents that are fighting against the Thai government.
Experts however, suggest that the southern insurgents would be resistant to ISIS
involvement in their struggle. Even so, the threat of ISIS in the region remains, even if
limited to hiding or acquiring fraudulent travel documents.
"ISIS In Thailand: An Unexpected Challenge." Katehon, September 12, 2015.
http://katehon.com/agenda/isis-thailand-unexpected-challenge.
Reports that Syrian members of ISIS had entered Bangkok to attack Russian tourists in
the capital city changes the dynamics of international politics in Southeast Asia. Russia
and China’s vested interest in protecting their borders and citizens have led to an
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increase in cooperation and rhetoric aimed at intelligence sharing and working together
to ensure that transnational groups are unable to use Thailand as a safe haven or point
of transit. Thailand is a strategic location for China and is a gateway to the Asia-Pacific.
Closer cooperation with China and Russia alienates the relationship with the west and
the U.S. Fear of sanctions and a desire to have continued cooperation with both the east
and west will likely force Thailand to act on their own to combat insurgent threats while
continuing to cooperate with international intelligence sharing efforts to defeat
transnational groups such as ISIS.
IS OPERATIONS IN THAILAND

Robbins, Siobhan. "'IS-linked' Pakistani Passport Forger Caught by Police in Thailand." Sky News,
January 19, 2018. https://news.sky.com/story/is-linked-pakistani-passport-forgercaught-by-police-in-thailand-11213529.
Thai police have arrested Mohammad Iqbal outside his home in Bangkok. Iqbal sold fake
passports to militants of insurgent operations including ISIS, and organized crime
groups. Iqbal was not known to be a member of any particular group, he sold passports
to order for between 7,000 and 8,000 Thai Bhat.
"Islamic State agents from Syria 'in Thailand to target Russians'." BBC News, December 4, 2015.
http://www.bbc.com/news/35003912.
Thai police were tipped off by Russian intelligence that 10 Syrians working for the Islamic State
entered Thailand to target Russia. The plan according to the memo was to target “Russians and
Russia’s alliance with Thailand.” According to Thai officials, of the over 200 Syrians that traveled
to Thailand, only 21 remain and there were “no irregularities.” Thailand has been known to be
used for transit for foreign fighters traveling to and from the Middle East.

JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH (JI)
For more detailed information on Jemaah Islamiyah and their operations in Southeast Asia,
please visit the Indonesia section on page 7.
"Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)." Counter Extremism Project. January 2018.
https://www.counterextremism.com/taxonomy/term/152.
The CEP identifies JI as an Indonesian based Islamic insurgency that has operational ties
to Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Cambodia, and Thailand. Their primary
motivation is to establish an Islamic caliphate in Southeast Asia through violence. JI
seeks to accomplish this goal through what CEP identifies as a “three-phase strategy of
violent jihad.” First, destabilize the local government. Second, undermine the efforts of
regional governments and infrastructure. Third, use its extensive networks with other
terrorist organizations with similar ideologies to launch a global jihad. The organization
is primarily funded through donations, criminal enterprises, and money laundering
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through front companies. The organization has a history of violent aggression since the
mid-nineties until it pledged its allegiance to ISIS (see previous sections on JI activities
that details the relationship and fallout with ISIS).
This annotation is taken from the Indonesia JI overview section on page 7 of this
document. JI has a limited operational environment in Thailand. Elements of JI have
acted as part of the umbrella organization of southern separatists but carry out limited
independent operations of their own in the country.
RECENT ATTACKS
"Roadside Bomb Attack Injures Six Rangers in Pattani." Thai PBS, January 10, 2018.
http://englishnews.thaipbs.or.th/roadside-bomb-attack-injures-six-rangers-pattani/.
A roadside IED injured six Thai Army Rangers in Patttani’s Non Chik district. The rangers
were responding to a report that surveillance cameras were tampered with near a
school in the southern provinces in Thailand.
Jirenuwat, Ryn, and Gerry Mullany. "Bangkok Hospital Bombing Wounds 24 on Anniversary of
Thai Coup." New York Times, May 22, 2017.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/22/world/asia/thailand-bangkok-hospital-bombblast.html?_r=0.
Attackers struck Phramongkutklao Hospital on the third anniversary of the army’s
seizing power to derail a populist movement that had won several national elections
over more than a decade. At least 24 people were wounded in the attack at the militaryowned hospital in Bangkok.
Hincks, Joseph. "A Series of 15 Grenade, Bomb and Gun Attacks Rock Southern Thailand." TIME,
April 20, 2017. http://time.com/4747715/southern-thailand-bomb-attacks/.
A series of 15 coordinated attacks launched by the Malay-Muslim separatists in Thai’s
southern provinces occurred within one hour of each other. In 12 of the attacks
grenades were used against military personnel or police forces. Two of the attackers
were killed when a bomb they were carrying fell and detonated. The attackers were the
latest in the ongoing conflict between the Thai government and southern militants.
"Insurgent Bomb And Gun Attacks Kill Three In Southern Thailand." Reuters, November 3, 2016.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-thailand-south/insurgent-bomb-and-gun-attackskill-three-in-southern-thailand-idUSKBN12Y091.
Three people died in attacks launched by Malay-Muslim seperatists against military
personnel in southern Thailand. The attacks come only a few months after failed peace
talks where neither side could come to agreeable terms. The conflict remains in the
southern provinces where separatists seek independence from the rest of Thailand.
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Head, Jonathan. "The Surreal Investigations into Thailand's Unresolved Bombings." BBC News,
August 17, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37091825.
Following a series of attacks in Thailand’s southern provinces the police and Thai antiterrorism forces are still looking for answers. The police have continuously tried to
suggest that the red-shirt movement is to blame, and any link to the separatist
insurgency in the southern provinces was dismissed. The actions of the Thai government
have been flippant and vague. They refuse to suggest that the separatists may be to
blame, for the acknowledgement would indicate that they have lost containment on the
southern insurgency. As of now, no group has claimed responsibility for the attacks.
Fuller, Thomas, and Edward Wong. "Thailand Blames Uighur Militants for Bombing at Bangkok
Shrine." New York Times, September 15, 2015.
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/16/world/asia/thailand-suspects-uighurs-in-bombattack-at-bangkok-shrine.html.
After a deadly bombing that killed 23 and wounded over 120, the Thai government
believes that a radical minority group from China, the Uighur militants are to blame. The
attack according to government officials, comes as retaliation against Thailand’s
willingness to force repatriation of Uighurs back to China, and the disruption of
organized crime and human trafficking that Uighur militants used for funding their
operations. The methodology used in this attack casts doubts for some analysts who
believe another insurgency group may be to blame. More unsettling, is that the
attackers may have been aided by Turkey’s Uighur population, and such accusations
have put a strain on relations with Turkey.
Liow, Joseph Chinyong. "A Preliminary Analysis of the Bangkok Bombing." Brookings. August 19,
2015. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2015/08/19/a-preliminary-analysis-ofthe-bangkok-bombing/.
Downtown Bangkok experienced a remotely detonated IED attack that killed 20 and
injured over 100 in a heavily tourist populated area of the city. The August attack on the
religious shrine in downtown Bangkok is different than any other in recent history. The
southern separatists have avoided attacking tourist areas due to the backlash their
quest for independence would face from the international community. The police are
still looking for suspects, and the Thai government is not limiting their search to local
militant groups due to the deviation from their usual pattern of attacks. International
religiously motivated groups such as ISIS, Jemaah Islamiyah, and Al-Qaeda, all of which
have operated in some capacity in Thailand may be the culprit. But, AQ and ISIS are
fighting in their own theaters and there is little to suggest that they are targeting
Thailand. The question remains, who is attacking Thailand’s capital city?
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ORGANIZED C RIME ACTIVITIES
Jones, Aidan, and Sally Mairs. "Rise and Fall of General Manas: Thailand's Top Trafficker." AFP,
July 22, 2017. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-4721810/Rise-fall-GeneralManas-Thailands-trafficker.html.
Lieutenant-General Mana Kongpan one of the most influencial figures in southern
Thailand turned himself into police and sentenced to 27 years in prison for trafficking.
The general was responsible for one of the largest organized crime elements in Thailand
and his operations specialized in human trafficking. His and other organized crime
groups are taking advantage of Rohingyas and Bangladeshis that are fleeing their
country to avoid the ongoing conflict in Myanmar. Victims were sold into forced labor
and the sex trade.
Trafficking in Persons Report. Report. U.S. Department of State. June 2017.
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/271345.pdf.
This report from the U.S. Department of State provides an analysis of trafficking in
Thailand. The State Department report provides information on the prevention
measures, prosecution for trafficking crimes, and recommendations for Thailand to
improve upon their human trafficking problem.
Herman, Steve. "Thailand to Indict Human Trafficking Suspects." VOA News, July 24, 2015.
https://www.voanews.com/a/thailand-to-indict-human-traffickingsuspects/2876684.html.
In sweeping raids, Thai authorities arrested 72 individuals involved in human trafficking
networks, including an Army officer and 4 policemen. The operation is seen as
Thailand’s biggest anti-human trafficking raid. Many Rohingya Muslims from Malaysia
attempt to cross into Thailand by sea and sometimes traffickers abandon them instead
of risking coming to shore with illegal migrants.
Naing, Saw Yan. "Illegal Log Trade Continues on Salween River." KBZ Bank, September 27, 2016.
https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/illegal-log-trade-continues-on-salweenriver.html.
Despite a nationwide logging ban, the illegal logging trade continues. 25 Tons of teak
logs were seized by the Thai military and Karen National Union (KNU). The logs were
destined to a company in the Karen State. In the 2016 - 2017 fiscal year, 1,940 tons of
smuggled logs and 104 units of heavy machinery were seized along with 117 smugglers
arrested. In a five year period, over 26,000 tons and 1,600 units were seized while over
1,000 smugglers were arrested.
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Thai Counter-Terrorism and Counterdrug Operations
Felbab-Brown, Vanda. "What Colombia Can Learn from Thailand on Drug Policy." Brookings.
May 4, 2017. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/05/04/whatcolombia-can-learn-from-thailand-on-drug-policy/.
The analysis from Brookings explores how Thailand’s model on combatting drug
trafficking and their drug policy should be used as a model for Columbia, a state that
deals with similar issues of illicit crop cultivation and trafficking. Thailand’s methodology
for dealing with their drug trade problem was a holistic approach. The Thai government
instead of pursuing crop eradication through violent counterinsurgency efforts used
rural development and negotiation with local community and village committees to
determine an agreement. Alternative livelihoods were designed as an income
replacement and an emphasis on infrastructure development communal investment
was supplanted to peacefully end widespread drug operations in Thailand.
Felbab-Brown, Vanda. "Enabling war and Peace: Drugs, Logs, Gems, and Wildlife in Thailand and
Burma." Brookings. December 7, 2015. https://www.brookings.edu/research/enablingwar-and-peace-drugs-logs-gems-and-wildlife-in-thailand-and-burma/.
This case study by Brookings explores the organized crime in Thailand and Burma
(Myanmar) that funded insurgency operations and ethnic separatism. Similarly to the
Brookings article by Vanda Felbab-Brown, this analysis heralds the Thai government’s
strategy for weaning local populations off of cultivating illicit crops and emphasizing
rural development to explore methodologies to eradicate the illegal drug trade.
Parameswaran, Prashanth. "Australia, Thailand Mull New Terror Pact Amid Islamic State
Fears." The Diplomat, January 24, 2016. https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/australiathailand-mull-new-terror-pact-amid-islamic-state-fears/.
Thailand and Australia plan to sign an anti-terrorism pact as concerns about ISIS
strongholds in the Asia-Pacific grow. Though ISIS does not currently have a presence in
Thailand, neighbors Indonesia and the Philippines have had to deal with ISIS
insurgencies. Nearly 800,000 Australians visit Thailand each year, and the two
governments acknowledge that cooperation is necessary to prevent foreign fighters
from leaving to assist ISIS abroad or from ISIS strengthening its presence in Southeast
Asia and the Pacific.
Moore, Jeff M. "COIN in Thailand: Combining Security and Socio-economic Policies."
International Institute for Strategic Studies. October 28, 2014.
https://www.iiss.org/en/events/events/archive/2014-0f13/october-b77b/coin-inthailand-3a1d.
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This hour long video discusses the counterinsurgency operations in Thailand. Thailand
has been fighting a separatist insurgency on its southern border for ten years, and has
defeated two previous insurgencies. Dr. Moore discusses what tactics and operations
have made Thailand’s COIN operations successful.
U.S. INVOLVEMENT
Cox, Dan G. "Signs of Growing Islamist Insurgency Create Apprehension in Thailand."
Jamestown Foundation. March 4, 2010. https://jamestown.org/program/signs-ofgrowing-islamist-insurgency-create-apprehension-in-thailand/.
The U.S. and Thai governments are increasing their joint anti-terrorism presence in the
provinces surrounding Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala where the Malay-Muslim
insurgency in southern Thailand operates. Their main point of concern is the impact on
the robust Thai tourist economy in and around Phuket. The complexity of the southern
insurgency and use of IEDs and other guerrilla tactics have made the government’s task
of eliminating the insurgent threat nearly impossible and Thailand’s ranking of
“extreme” on the Terrorism Risk Index will likely dissuade U.S. travelers from visiting the
country, where over 1,000 people die annually to the conflict.
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